Resilience Strategy for Farmers Faced with Boko Haram Armed Groups in the Far North of Cameroon

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Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyze the resilience of the peasant populations, victims of the abuses of the Islamist Group Boko Haram in the Far North Region of Cameroon. This article is qualitative. Field data was collected in the Far North Region, in parallel with documentary research in March and April 2021. Interviews were carried out with officials from the Cameroonian Government, NGOs, and Community Organizations. United Nations in charge of internally displaced persons and Refugees, internally displaced persons, members of host families. In addition, direct observation was made of the structures set up to facilitate the resilience of vulnerable populations in the Far North Region. The conflict with Boko Haram regularly commits massacres and violence of rare cruelty perpetrated against civilians, intentional homicides (suicide bombings in civilian areas), acts of torture, hostage-taking, kidnappings, recruitment of child soldiers, looting and destruction of public, private and religious property, suicide attacks often committed by women and children, affecting the survival of local populations. Overnight, in search of means of survival, a former cattle breeder moved to an office job offered by NGOs or other international structures set up for conflict and post-conflict management. However, this tertiarisation of activities and this modification of flows constitute obstacles to the resilience of the people of the Far North. The tertiarisation of activities removes the victims of the Boko Haram conflict from their original cultures, from their ways of life before the passage of Boko Haram. How can we enable a population to recover in such a context if the actions of the Cameroonian Government and its partners in the management of internally displaced persons, refugees and host populations have the consequences of causing the bases of their identities, their traditions, to disappear, their habits and customs.

Keywords: Boko Haram, peasantry, insecurity, vigilante groups, resilience, Mayo-Tsanaga, Cameroon

Résumé: L'objectif de cet article est de montrer comment la situation insécuritaire a désaxé le mode de vie sur le système de la justice traditionnelle, la création, le renforcement et l'organisation des groupes de dialogue, des groupes d'autodéfenses. De nos jours, la Région de l'Extrême-Nord du Cameroun, principalement le Département de Mayo-Tsanaga est régulièrement en proie à des violences d'une rare cruautés perpétrées par le mouvement terroriste Boko Haram. Tous ces mouvements des populations, principalement dans le Département de Mayo-Tsanaga ont révélé l'ampleur des complicités locales dont bénéficiaient les insurgés. Soucieux d'affaiblir leurs soutiens locaux et optimiser le renseignement prévisionnel et opérationnel, les autorités camerounaises ont réactualisé les mécanismes de défense communautaire à travers les groupes d'autodéfense communément appelés « comités locaux de vigilance » qui prolifèrent dans la quasi-totalité des villes et villages de l'Extrême-Nord (ICG, Février 2017). Seulement force est de constater que ce conflit avec Boko Haram a continué à déstabiliser cette Région, avec une forte insécurité caractérisée par de multiples attentats (souvent commis par des femmes et des enfants), des attaques contre les populations civiles, des enlèvements et meurtres ainsi que la destruction et le vol de biens. Les déplacées constituées pour l'essentiel du paysannat font face à des conditions de vie précaires, un accès inadéquat aux services sociaux de base et aux risques de violences. Les mesures de sécurité mises en œuvre par les autorités camerounaises et la Force Multinationale ont également un impact sur la liberté de circulation de ces populations, affectant ainsi leurs perspectives d'autonomisation.

Mots clés: Boko Haram, paysannat, insécurité, groupes de vigilance, résilience, Mayo-Tsanaga, Cameroun

Introduction

The Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad (Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad; Yoruba: BòkóÀráámùù), better known by its nickname Boko Haram, is an insurgent terrorist movement based on Salafist jihadist ideology. Formed in 2002 in Maiduguri by the preacher Mohamed Yusuf, the group was originally a sect that advocated a radical and rigorous Islam, hostile to all Western influence. Since its creation in 2002, Boko Haram has committed a series of acts of violence. In 2009, Boko Haram launched an armed insurrection in which Mohamed Yusuf was killed. Initially described as a sect advocating a radical and rigorous Islam, it later drew closer to al-Qaeda and then to the Islamic State. Since 2009, it has been led by Abubakar Shekau. The entire Lake Chad region is affected.

The movement is responsible for numerous massacres, attacks and kidnappings against civilian populations of all faiths, in Nigeria but also in Cameroon, Niger and Chad. It is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and was classified as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council on 22 May 2014. Assassinations, bombings, looting: in the Lake Chad region, people never stop dreading the violence of the Islamist sect Boko Haram ("Western education is a sin" in Hausa).

1. Background

According to the UNHCR, 90,000 registered refugees have entered through the towns of Kewara, Amchidé, Fotokol, Tourou and Mogodé, and are mainly concentrated in the Minawao camp (which has been hosting more than 59,000 since July 2013, despite having a capacity of only 19,000) and the neighbouring villages, which are home to almost 33,000 refugees. There are just as many internally displaced people in the Region's localities (Mémé, Makary, Kousseri, Afadé), and supporting them poses huge humanitarian challenges. Up to September 2017, there were 325,589 uprooted people, including 235,913 internally displaced persons, 30,278 unregistered refugees and 59,398 returnees. 91% of these displaced people are displaced by the Boko Haram conflict (1). The countries affected by the threat - Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger - have since united to respond to the attacks and regain ground.

Like all the countries in the Lake Chad Basin, Cameroon is regularly the victim of terrorist attacks that threaten the peace and lives of its people, as well as its national security. In Cameroon's Far North, Boko Haram commits massacres against civilians, intentional homicides (suicide bombings in civilian areas, for example), acts of torture, hostage-taking, kidnappings, recruitment of child soldiers, looting and destruction of public, private and religious property, and suicide attacks, affecting the survival of local populations. "*Three hundred and eleven (311) people were kidnapped by hostage-takers in the Region between 2015 and 2018; twenty-nine (29) of them were freed by the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and the Motorised Infantry Brigade (BIM), with the support of the Vigilance Committees; two hundred and twelve (212) people were released following the payment of a ransom by their relatives; more than two billion (2,000,000,000) CFA francs in ransoms were paid to the hostage-takers; seventy (70) people were executed during their captivity*" (2). This is a worrying humanitarian situation. The number of refugees and displaced persons increased in 2017. In May 2018, there were 96,000 Nigerian refugees (including 65,000 in the Minawao camp) and 238,000 displaced Cameroonians. Of the region's four million inhabitants, 2.1 million were in need of humanitarian assistance in January 2018" (3).While the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a decisive turning point in international security policies, the Boko Haram attacks on Cameroon have contributed to the tightening of security in that country. Indeed, after the exactions of the Islamic sect Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon, in particular the hostage-taking, the Cameroonian Head of State made a declaration of war against Boko Haram on 17 May 2014, "*Cameroon adheres to the classic scheme of the fight against terrorism (waging war) enshrined by the United States, since 2001*". This has been accompanied by an increase in military operations on the ground to the detriment of repressive measures. Faced with this almost chaotic situation, the issue of a resilience strategy for the peasantry remains a real concern.

2. Materials and Methods

This is a qualitative study. It was conducted in the Far North Region over a one-month period from 1 to 30 March 2021. The field survey made it possible to collect primary data from around forty informants recruited consecutively until the saturation threshold was reached, including: security agents, lawyers, community leaders, NGOs involved in the fight against Boko Haram, local authorities, heads of households who were victims of Boko Haram's actions, and vulnerable populations (women/children). These informants were chosen on the basis of convenience sampling, in a reasoned and non-random way. The sites were chosen to be representative of the region and its urban and rural geographical location. These were the departments of Mayo-Sava (Mora; Kolofata) and Mayo-Tsanaga (Mokolo).

We used standard anthropological survey techniques. Methods such as semi-structured interviews with informants, life stories, direct observation and focus group discussions were used to collect primary data using interview guides. The qualitative data collected was transcribed and entered into Word. A thematic analysis was then carried out for all categories of interviewees. Secondary data was also analysed, based on consultation of specialist literature on terrorism in various documentation centers and libraries, not forgetting web-based data (online documents or articles). In order to provide a scientific basis for this article, the theory of resilience was used as the analytical basis to describe all the actions of the stakeholders in supporting the resilience of the peasantry in the face of Boko Haram's armed forces.

2.1. Traditional way of life

Boko Haram has affected the survival of the population through multiple kidnappings intended not only to demand ransoms from the families of the victims of these acts, but also to turn some of the hostages into suicide bombers. This situation has had a negative impact on the region's economy, making this area, already the poorest in pre-conflict Cameroon, a territory where economic insecurity is creating a humanitarian crisis. The people of the Far North are for the most part nomadic and sedentary, living off livestock and agriculture. Boko Haram's atrocities have radically changed their traditional way of life. For example, the sect had introduced a 10% tax on any lucrative activity, which all farmers were obliged to pay on pain of death. In response to Boko Haram's demands, the farmers have turned to trade rather than agricultural production, with a view to generating income to offset the 10% levied by Boko Haram. This is no easy task in a context of insecurity, where the population is finding it extremely difficult to engage in income-generating activities. What's more, it's all the more dangerous because this region borders Nigeria and Chad, where the actions of these terrorists are particularly acute. But because of the conflict, trade and travel around the area are severely restricted or even banned by the governments of the three countries, making it even more difficult for the Cameroonian population to survive economically.

Yet funding levels for humanitarian aid are low, while insecurity in the area and the government's reluctance to provide escorts for humanitarian actors make access to vulnerable people difficult. The situation of Nigerian refugees and displaced Cameroonians remains precarious. It is therefore vital to place particular emphasis on the resilience of these vulnerable populations. "Resilience" is one of the most polysemous terms, given its multidisciplinary use, particularly in the human and social sciences, the environment, medicine and, more recently, by business economists"(4).

Starting from a purely physical definition, i.e. the ability of a material to retain its elastic properties under pressure, the example of the high level of 'resilience' of a mattress is a major selling point in the bedding industry. In psychology, the term resilience is used to describe the ability to rebuild one's life and flourish by overcoming a serious traumatic shock. In ecology, resilience is the ability of an ecosystem or species to recover normal functioning and/or development after suffering a trauma. From an epistemological point of view, resilience is the subject of a war of appropriation between disciplines and between researchers in the same discipline. In France, ethologist Boris Cyrulnik claims to be the father of the concept(5).

2.2. Resilience of populations in the face of security and repressive measures taken by the State

In addition to the jihad instigated by Boko Haram, the security and repressive measures taken by the Cameroonian government are creating a certain amount of astonishment among the population, due to the numerous restrictions. With the extensive definition of acts of terrorism provided by the 2014 anti-terrorism law, citizens are afraid of being accused of defying the public authorities (6). In their minds, claiming their rights is tantamount to opposing the established order. "With all the laws the government has passed, we're afraid to demand certain things for our protection. We prefer to put up with everything, whether it's the government or Boko Haram. This fear is perceptible because the local people believe that the legal framework is more repressive and does not allow them to carry out their activities in complete freedom. So, they are resisting and giving up all claims to their freedoms.

2.3. Resilience in a survival context

Repeated attacks by the Islamist sect Boko Haram in the Far North have increased the vulnerability of the population. Their standard of living has plummeted. In this context of survival, it is difficult to apply or submit to the discourse of human rights insofar as the priority for any human being in a crisis situation is to find the basic means of subsistence. There is a popular saying that "*a hungry stomach has no ears*". In other words, you don't talk about human rights to someone who is homeless in their own country, let alone in this situation of extreme poverty, which is still glaringly obvious in the Far North region. In this region of "extremes", poverty is linked to early marriage, lack of education and high unemployment or the scarcity of jobs. In this context, personal fulfilment becomes very difficult. Add to this the atrocities of Boko Haram, and the situation becomes simply unbearable. In fact, the current context is marked by people's disaffection with the ineffectiveness of current policies in positively transforming people's living conditions, particularly by creating jobs for a rapidly growing youth population(7). This leads to another form of resilience, which is none other than the trivialisation of counter-terrorism measures in Cameroon. In fact, the official discourse at the moment is that of a security emergency. The population is living in an uncertain situation that could degenerate at any moment. They take into account the diffuse nature of a threat that is likely to strike "*anywhere, anytime, anything, anyone and anyhow*", through attacks perpetrated by foreign nationals or seemingly perfectly integrated Cameroonian citizens. There is a climate of mistrust between public institutions and non-state actors, with the former

accusing the latter of plotting with enemies outside the State of Cameroon. In this climate of suspicion, the exercise of freedoms remains difficult in the context of the fight against terrorism.

There is a real conflict between ancestral cultural values and so-called modern values. In the context of the fight against terrorism in Cameroon, there is a link between the lack of respect for human rights and the rise of terrorism or the emergence of crises in general. The lack of respect for human rights is at the root of many conflicts in the Far North region. This may be due to the greater concentration of poor people in both rural and urban areas. For example, for every 10 people living in rural areas, 8 live in extreme poverty. It is clear that efforts to combat poverty in Cameroon must be focused on rural areas. The poverty situation in the Far North region is particularly worrying. This worsening trend in poverty since 2001 in this part of Cameroon can be explained by a lack of potential. As its name suggests, this is a region of extremes: it has the lowest rates of literacy, school attendance, access to electricity and health coverage in the country. This has an undeniable impact on human capital, income-generating activities, and road, health and education infrastructure, all of which have the potential to drastically reduce poverty. What's more, in recent years this region has suffered from negative external shocks such as recurrent flooding since 2012. If we add to this the atrocities perpetrated by Boko-Haram, which have led to the phenomenon of internally displaced people, as well as refugees abandoning their income-generating activities: farming, commerce, livestock rearing, etc., this has had a serious impact on people's living conditions. This has had serious repercussions on people's living conditions. For example, as a result of the atrocities committed by the Boko-Haram Islamic sect, the borders with Nigeria are regularly closed, restricting cross-border trade between this region of Cameroon and Nigeria, a trade that provides a livelihood for the local population.

The humanitarian situation in Cameroon is determined by both internal and external factors. Internally, the irregularity, shortfall and/or earliness of the rains have led to a 40% reduction in the area planted. This unfavorable rainfall, combined with other phenomena such as locust invasions and local cereal production shortfalls, have led to pockets of food insecurity in the Far North. This rainfall, coupled with the poor maintenance and dilapidation of certain hydraulic infrastructures (dams, dykes, etc.), has caused numerous floods since 2012, resulting in the mass displacement of populations. The consequences of these forced displacements are detrimental to the education of children who no longer have access to their classrooms, either because they have been destroyed or because people have moved in search of safer shelter. If we refer to Koné: *"Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border"*(8).

Internal migration in Cameroon is a new issue for society. From our observations and interviews in the field, it appears that there is no real support scheme for internally displaced persons and refugees. Their integration, whether in terms of education, health, the economy or nutrition, had not been thought through in advance. By way of illustration, this article has shed some light on internally displaced pupils.

2.4. Internally displaced persons and resilience
Internally displaced persons are a new problem in Cameroon. For nearly a decade now, Cameroon has been plagued by conflict in the Far North region, with atrocities committed by the Islamic sect Boko Haram. Displacement caused by disasters and the effects of climate change is a reality, and one of the greatest challenges facing governments and the international community in the 21st century. Every year, millions of people are displaced by disasters caused by natural hazards such as floods, tropical storms, earthquakes, landslides, drought, saltwater intrusion, glacial melt, glacial flooding and melting permafrost. In total, between 2008 and 2014, 184.4 million people were displaced by sudden-onset disasters, an average of 26.4 million people newly displaced each year. On average, 22.5 million people a year are displaced by weather- and climate-related hazards. The remainder are displaced by rising sea levels, desertification or environmental degradation."(9).

It is a large-scale phenomenon with devastating effects on individuals and communities. It raises many protections concerns and hampers development in many countries. These challenges are compounded by the fact that disasters amplify existing vulnerabilities. Injured and sick people, children (especially orphans and unaccompanied children), female-headed households, people with disabilities, the elderly, migrants and members of indigenous communities are often among the worst affected disaster survivors. Least developed countries, small island developing states, African countries and middle-income countries face particular challenges and their populations are hardest hit. While many displaced people are able to return home after a period of time, tens of millions need existing protection and assistance, as well as support to find durable solutions and end their displacement.

International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science (IJLRHSS)
Volume 07 - Issue 02, 2024
www.ijlrhss.com || PP. 163-177

2.5. Nutritional resilience of populations

The situation has major nutritional consequences, particularly for children and women. The prevalence of acute malnutrition is close to emergency thresholds in the Far North region. Chronic malnutrition is at high levels in almost all regions: 33% at national level according to the DHS-MICS (above the critical threshold set by the WHO of 30%(10). This situation is not only due to the availability of food. Environmental conditions, limited access to health and water, recurrent epidemics (cholera, measles, acute respiratory infections, malaria) combined with low vaccination coverage, and inadequate food and hygiene practices are major determinants. In a region already marked by the persistence of harmful social and cultural practices, this situation increases the vulnerability of children by increasing the risks of exploitation, trafficking, GBV and early marriage.

The relatively high level of poverty (39.9% in 2007) is a factor of increased vulnerability for the populations affected by this humanitarian situation. An estimated 26% of Cameroonians live in chronic poverty. In addition, 9.9% of Cameroonians are not poor, but are at risk of falling into lower levels of poverty due to the volatility of their consumption levels. Poverty in Cameroon is essentially a rural phenomenon (55% in 2007). It disproportionately affects the North and Far North regions, which have seen the biggest increases in poverty rates: 13.6% for the Far North and 9.6% for the North. Due to demographic growth of around 2.7%, the number of poor people is increasing significantly. In cultural terms, it is worth noting the persistence of harmful social and cultural practices. Poverty is compounded by the risks associated with environmental shocks, which have a direct impact on the livelihoods of 45% of the population who work in subsistence agriculture. People's livelihoods have been further weakened by the succession of humanitarian crises since 2008 (epidemics, drought, floods, etc.). The limited supply of basic infrastructure and social services, particularly in rural areas affected by humanitarian crises, is one of the factors that aggravate these crises when they occur, and is the source of community tensions between host and refugee populations in some cases, particularly as a result of the occupation of schools and other public buildings. In addition, porous borders with CAR, Nigeria and Chad make the country vulnerable to imported epidemics of polio, measles and cholera.

2.6. Resilience of the post-conflict population

In 2018, the presence of Boko Haram in Logone-et-Chari is much less noticeable felt. However, the department's population is still struggling to rebuild their lives. post-conflict resilience is not sufficiently in place to enable the people of the Far the people of the Far North to recover. For Mérindol, V., planning is a decision-making tool for large organisations(11).It meets the needs of decision-makers for tools to define and guide organisational strategies for carrying out complex activities in an uncertain environment. Planning organises activities according to a plan. The aim of planning is to better match objectives with resources, based on known solutions. It is developed on the basis of the knowledge mastered by the organisation, and is therefore directly linked to operating activities.

Deterritorialisation refers to the flight or uprooting of a population from its territory and the upheaval in the way it lives in space and in its daily practices. Deterritorialisation does not always involve displacement; it can occur in situ, when people lose control of the territory in which they live, when they no longer have a plot of land or the minimum conditions for living there are no longer met, or if they live with a feeling of insecurity and cannot move around freely(12).It is true that the Cameroon government and NGOs have already taken initiatives to provide aid to the population, in particular by supplying primary resources (water, rice, wheat, etc.) and rebuilding facilities (medical centers, schools, etc.). However, these solutions turn out to be short-term operations, aimed at making up for the most urgent shortcomings.

But the resilience of the Cameroonian population can only be achieved in the long term and not through sporadic measures that are unreliable and not through sporadic measures that cannot be relied on to last. There is also the risk of making Boko Haram followers the main beneficiaries, through the looting of food aid and corruption. This means that the local population has to play an active part in building its own resilience, freeing itself from poisoned support despite goodwill, while at the same time being part of a more general national reconstruction dynamic of reconstruction that would put an end to the isolation of Cameroon's Far North.

2.7. Developing a plan or planning process

A plan is the product of the planning process. It can be defined as an ordered set of decisions about what is to be done, why it is to be done and how it is to be done. As a common framework for action, the plan is the result of the consensus-building process, which must secure the agreement of all the actors working in the areas covered, as well as the other stakeholders contributing to its implementation (13).

2.8. Assistance scheme

This article also highlights the fact that many humanitarian crises are managed through a system of assistance in which the affected population plays very little part. However, a population's psychological capacity

International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science (IJLRHSS)
Volume 07 - Issue 02, 2024
www.ijlrhss.com || PP. 163-177

to accept that traumatic events have occurred and to continue to live as before - in other words, to be resilient - can only be fully achieved with the participation of all the players in the geographical area concerned. This does not seem to be the case in the Far North region. The jobs held by the local population in the NGOs will only have the effect of exporting a western system to an area which, before the conflict, lived according to its local cultures, or even its habits and customs. This can be seen, for example, in the bans on trading with or travelling to Nigeria and Chad, important trading points for Cameroon's Far North, forcing agricultural producers to integrate the logic of globalisation with product flows to distant lands.

2.9. Resilience in farming

Despite this, a minority are returning, not without difficulty, to their formertrades. In fact, in the aftermath of the conflict, many local workerskeep jobs that are linked to NGOs and other international aid agencies. And so,we know, for example, that internally displaced people and most refugees are basically nomadic pastoralists. They live and practice only animal husbandry. Or sedentary people who farm. From one day to the next, in search of the means to survive, a former cattle farmer has moved into an office job offered by NGOs or other international structures set up to manage the conflict and post-conflict situation. This tertiarisation of activities and this change in flows are obstacles to the resilience of the people of Logone-et-Chari. It alienates them from their original cultures and ways of life before Boko Haram came along, and how can a population recover from such a situation if the actions of aid workers have the effect of wiping out the foundations of their identities, traditions and customs? These identities are a subtle blend of histories, economic practices and links between individuals, all components linked to the process of resilience. No anthropologist, still less a historian, or an economist who sets himself up as a displaced person forced by crises, a victim of the Boko Haram insurrections, would be able to understand perfectly, to integrate exactly what a cultural group needs after a conflict. Assessing the workings of an identity is subject to such subjectivity that to avoid a distorted assessment against a backdrop of unintentional ethnocentrism on the part of NGOs, the involvement of the local populations of Logone-et-Chari is essential to their own resilience.

The specific configuration of the territory of the Far North of Cameroon means that the opinions of the local populations have to be taken into account all the more as they are partly dependent on Nigeria and Chad for their trade and farming. These (sometimes nomadic) populations are therefore in a better position to know what areas they need to cross to graze their herds, or what legal and para-legal means they depend on to re-establish their pre-conflict way of life, a marker of successful resilience. They will not be able to depend solely on the presence of NGOs for their survival. In this way, the active participation of the local population in their own resilience is essential if the process is to succeed. The presence of local people in the debates and in the projects will help them to heal the wounds that Boko Haram has inflicted on their cultural identities. For example, a local herder can explain the importance in his culture of the nomadic nature of his way of life. This would make it possible to avoid imposing a sedentarisation of activities following the economic model of the countries contributing to the restoration of peace in the region.

2.10. Active participation of the local population in its own resilience

The Far North region is home to a people who traditionally grow rice, wheat, sorghum and other crops. The Boko Haram insurrection has left them without arable land. But they receive food donations from actors or NGOs that in no way correspond to their food systems. Witnessing this way of life would help them to understand that whatever the yields, the important thing is to re-establish their way of life. However, when they receive aid, they are not involved in the decision to distribute it. Very often, it would appear that a pre-conflict study of lifestyles is not carried out to decide what type of aid is appropriate for their eating habits. So the active participation of the local population in its own post-Boko Haram resilience is essential, because simple financial aid is actually fatal for the future of this territory. Assistance alone makes local people dependent on a system that is not their own. The people of Logone-et-Chari already have their own cultural systems that do not need to be replaced. It is therefore essential to include local contributors to the resilience of the local population, in a spirit of aid rather than assistance that generates dependence on the contributors.

In 2019, Dr Lamine's course on educational planning emphasised that planning is about finding solutions to an unsatisfactory situation by determining the outcomes that will most effectively address the problems and needs identified, and the actions and resources needed to achieve those outcomes. It forms the basis of good performance management and accountability. Planning can also be defined as a process of choosing between different possible courses of action and prioritising the steps to be taken to change a specific situation for the better. Generally speaking, time and resources (material, financial, human) are limited. These two constraints have a direct impact on an organisation's ability to improve or resolve a difficult situation(13).

As it happens, the Far North Region is applying the Cameroon government's reforms like any other territory in the country, but it is also the subject of national programs such as the "President's gifts" and those of

civil society. These sums are relatively small in relation to the needs of the Far North. In reality, the key to resilience is to increase central government actions, other than financial ones. It is not the payment of small sums of money that will have a long-term impact and enable the population to rebuild after the passage of Boko Haram. It should be noted that the most significant actions are cultural and educational in order to prevent such events from happening again in the future.

The aim of this was to give victims and perpetrators a voice so that the truth could be established, without the threat of conviction. This process enabled individuals to be recognised as victims and perpetrators to be reintegrated into civil society once their mea culpa had been pronounced. However, such a procedure was only possible for criminals whose acts were of "low seriousness". In other words,not leaders. This configuration could be reproduced withCameroon's Boko Haram. This jihadist movement is characterised by the ideological indoctrination of itsideological indoctrination of its followers, which presupposes a psychological hold by the leaders on theon those who carry it out. The latter would be the candidates for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this context, explanations could be given to the people of the Far North to show that their executioners were in fact in power that their executioners were in fact under psychological control. This procedureis particularly effective for child offenders. The commission would bethe first step in coping with the traumatic effects of Boko Haram.Then, still taking inspiration from Rwanda, it is possible to introduce measures that are more educational than those directly linked to justicemore educational measures than those directly linked to justice. To strengthen the recognition ofstatus for the population of Cameroon's Far North, the government couldintroduce a national day in memory of the tragic events linked to Boko Haram. It is essential that this day is national and not regional, because resilience will only be quicker if the victims realise that they are victims.Resilience will be all the faster if the victims see that they have a whole nation supporting them in theirpost-traumatic episode. Consequently, it is up to the Cameroonian government to lead such a project in order to unite its people around a single nation of solidarity. As a result,Logone-et-Chari would not feel abandoned by central government, even when the militarywhen the military side of the conflict with Boko Haram had subsided. This process ofties between the Far North and the rest of the country, which is conducive to resilience, mayalso involvemay also involve practices other than simply establishing a national day.It is important, as it was after the genocide in Rwanda, to erect monuments tothe memory of the victims of Boko Haram. Such initiatives wouldserve a dual purpose: to honor the death of the elders who sacrificed themselves so that the youngergenerations to survive, and to educate the future citizens of Cameroon about the consequences ofviolence in their region. Beyond simple resilience, the government would send a message to the population that such acts should never be toleratedthat such acts should never be repeated in the interests of the population.If such a concept is assimilated by future generations, it will only reduce the number of Cameroonian members of future movements,future Jihadist movements.

Whether it's the national day, ceremonies for the dead or other practices, the ultimateaim is to create a community resilience dynamic,the ultimate aim is to create a dynamic of community resilience. This ability toovercome traumatic shocks occurs more easily within a group with shared cultural normscultural norms. Knowledge is part of an individual's culture and identityan individual's identity. So, it is still possible to draw inspiration from Rwanda in this area.Rwanda. The introduction of school programs dealing with the presence of Boko Haram, its methods ofits indoctrination methods and warfare techniques, would make it possible to warn theCameroonian population about such events, which could potentially happen again. It's a bit like children being taught how to react to an earthquakereact to an earthquake. It is also possible to apply the same methodsthe same methods with regard to Jihadist movements and therefore prevent the recruitment ofCameroonians by warring factions. As a result of these revelations, the Cameroonian populationwould inevitably feel that the government is opposed to Boko Haram, but also wishes tothat this kind of situation never happens again.

3. Post-Boko Haram resilience in the Far North

Post-Boko Haram resilience in the Far North of Cameroon can only be achieved througharound a dual dynamic. Local actions and national programs. This means thatin other words, thepopulation personally affected by Boko Haram must stand up for itselfbecause no one canunderstand a trauma better than those who have experienced one of the same kind of trauma.However, this does not absolve the state of its responsibility forgovernance. It must implement policies to support the resilience of the people of the regionsresilience of the peoples of regions that have suffered, such as Logone-et-Chari. These processes will promotethe emergence of a national unity that strengthens the people's capacity to reveal themselves after theevents linkedto Boko Haram, because it's easy to fell a tree but much harder to cut down a forestto fell a forest.

The Cameroonian government has put in place a body of practical and technological measures backed by two anti-terrorist operations to ensure territorial integrity in the areas most at risk from terrorist attacks, namely Logone et Chari (Kousseri), Mayo Sava (Mora; Kolofata) and Mayo Tsanaga (Mokolo). These measures are:

International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science (IJLRHSS)
Volume 07 - Issue 02, 2024
www.ijlrhss.com || PP. 163-177

Emergence 3 (from Military Region 3) and Operation Alpha led by the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR). This national security mechanism has been supported by community initiatives in the far north of Cameroon: vigilance committees. The vigilance committees have made a vital contribution to the fight against Boko Haram. These fellow citizens, mainly farmers, fishermen, shepherds and craftsmen, have committed themselves to securing their villages in the face of the threat posed by the troops of the jihadist militia. The success of the operations carried out by the regular troops in the countries attacked by the terrorists was based on this military-civilian system of territorial surveillance and intelligence. Their knowledge of the terrain gave them a comparative advantage over the regular armies, most of whose members had very little knowledge of the terrain. At the start of the war, there was a vigilance committee in almost every village10, but today there are fewer of them. The latest national initiative in the fight against Boko Haram, and one of the least important, launched by the head of the Cameroonian armed forces in 2015, is the popularisation of the fight against the jihadist sect. From north to south and east to west, Cameroonians from all walks of life have contributed both in kind and in kind to the logistical support of the troops at the front and of the affected populations. The "war effort", three years later, according to the administrative authority's report, enabled, among other things, the construction of social infrastructures and the resumption of economic activities in the Far North.

The proof is in the raids on villages, where even the smallest basic necessities are taken away.On the night of 06 November 2019, Pastor David Mokoni was killed by jihadists in the village of Moskotawas killed by jihadists in the village of Moskota. He thought he was safe after a minister's visit to the locality, a hundred or so huts were vandalised and a hundred or so oxen taken away. Informant reveals: "The Boko Haram attack hospitals to steal medicines. This year, sightseeing won the contract to distribute impregnated mosquito nets (LLINs), so I had to do this work with a colleague under BIR escort. When we got to...we found that the Boko Haram had attacked the health centre, and slit the throat of the head of the centre and the member of the vigilance committee. They stole all the medicines.

Boko Haram has fallen into acts of organised crime as a result of the national and sub-regional struggles waged by the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, namely Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin, as well as its internal split. These two factors have contributed to its fragility. The introduction of a war economy policy also justifies the perpetration of acts of banditry, raids and extreme violence against the populations of the most vulnerable departments (Mayo Tsanaga, Sava and Logone et Chari). A number of strategies for reducing the violence inflicted on the population by Boko Haram were also highlighted. One way of addressing this violence would be to strengthen the role of vigilance committees. Local people also blame the lax security arrangements, which they say are no longer part of a proactive approach to containing the terrorist threat. This may explain Boko Haram's frequent incursions outside Nigeria's borders.Otherwise, in general terms, the following recommendations were made by the participants.

A sensitive sociological analysis of crises looks at safety and the means of protecting both teachers and pupils. It also examines the resilience of the education system in the face of crises and disasters. It needs to understand the extent to which education can also exacerbate conflicts. If necessary, new policies can be developed to improve the security and resilience of the education system. In this way, in the event of conflict or natural disaster, the education system will be able to guarantee school-age children a quality education on an equitable basis.

Conflicts in war situations have disastrous repercussions on schoolchildren. The combined actions of the public authorities, the private sector and NGOs do not follow a plan drawn up in advance, which would anticipate the needs of displaced pupils and give clarity to the actions undertaken. As a result of the persistence of this crisis, large numbers of pupils from the Extreme North region continue to flock to the major cities, with no immediate support for their educational needs. This leaves them in a precarious situation and exposed to all kinds of deviance (rape, theft, prostitution, etc.), which threatens their education and schooling. This situation raises the overall problem of the ineffectiveness of educational planning in times of crisis in Cameroon, and in particular the problem of integrating displaced pupils in times of crisis.

3.1. Travel: an open door to poverty

Forced displacement impoverishes individuals, families andcommunities. Internally displaced people often lose their land and property, and with it their livelihoods and access to health and education services, while hosts sometimes exhaust their resources to cope with new arrivals, particularly in Africa where most IDPs are hosted by relatives or in host communities. Impoverishment refers to the loss of natural capital, man-made material capital, human capital and social capital. Nine risks or processes are at the root of the impoverishment of displaced persons: not having land, not having a job, not having a house, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to public goods and services, fraying of the social fabric and loss of educational opportunities.

International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science (IJLRHSS)
Volume 07 - Issue 02, 2024
www.ijlrhss.com || PP. 163-177

3.2. Protection of displaced persons

In 2021, the protection threats identified can be divided into five main categories of rights violations: (1) family separation due to forced displacement, (2) arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions undermining the population's freedom of movement, (3) killings of civilians and bodily injuries taking place, among other things, during incursions into villages by non-state armed groups, (4) extortion and destruction of property and personal belongings by all parties to the crisis and criminal gangs, and (5) abduction of adults and children mainly to forcibly join non-state armed groups. Protection monitoring in 2021 showed that extortion and destruction of property accounted for the majority of incidents recorded in the intervention zones, followed by incidents of physical aggression. While men are the primary targets because they are the traditional owners of property and homes, women and children are exposed to violence and abuse compounded by the lack of effective access to social services.(14).

Situations of collective violence have the following consequences: the displacement of populations, the destruction of social networks and ecosystems, the insecurity in which civilians and other non-combatants live, and human rights abuses. The public health consequences of collective violence have harmful effects on society. According to these specialists, they result in an almost exponential increase in mortality and morbidity due to the total breakdown of health services, the often systematic destruction of public water supply and sanitation services, the massive displacement of populations and its corollaries, etc. (15).

3.3. Humanitarian space and access for IDPs

The aim is to strengthen the resilience and absorption capacities of host communities, as the vast majority of internally displaced people in Africa do not live in camps or settlements but stay with family members or alone in host communities, which are then also affected by displacement. Support for these communities should not only focus on humanitarian aid, but also on development initiatives to strengthen infrastructure and basic services, and to improve food security and the availability of shelter and housing - measures that would benefit both host communities and IDPs.

In addition, more than two-thirds of the world's internally displaced persons live in protracted displacement situations, which all too often encourage dependency among those receiving humanitarian assistance. Remedying protracted situations of displacement would therefore be the best way of ensuring that displaced people return to their usual environment as quickly as possible. Restoring or improving means of subsistence and providing adequate housing, water, sanitation, health and education services in areas where IDPs live are all development challenges. Addressing these challenges helps IDPs regain their autonomy while promoting development and reducing poverty in the target areas.

3.4. Internal displacements and vulnerabilities

More than 750,000 people are affected by displacement in Cameroon, including around 350,000 refugees mainly from the Central African Republic and Nigeria and almost 400,000 internally displaced people in the Far North, North, North West and South West regions(16).It should be noted that, compared with the national attendance rate of 75.1%, the Far North region has an attendance rate of 54.9%(17). At the same time, under-enrolment in the region at 45.1% is much higher than the national figure of 24.9%, according to the Central Bureau of Census and Population Studies.

Faced with the massive influx of displaced pupils, the emergency measures taken are not isolated; the same observation is made in all the regions receiving these pupils. As well as the migration of pupils, there is also the migration of teachers. Indeed, in the daily Cameroun Tribune of 02 September 2019(18) gathered from the Minister of Basic Education that the number of teachers in the North-West and South-West regions has fallen from 400,000 to almost 90,000. However, it is not possible to know exactly where these teachers are, even though there is a crying need for teachers in schools in the regions hosting displaced pupils. "Public schools automatically report the arrival of these pupils, but public schools do not; we need to go out into the field to refine the statistics" (19).

According to numerous studies in Africa, the Far North region is classified as very high risk, and the Adamaoua, East and North regions as high risk. This is due in particular to the high levels of several vulnerability factors (displacement, malnutrition and the condition of children under the age of 5) and exposure to natural hazards (such as floods and drought) and human factors (in particular conflict). The Extreme North region is classified as very high risk and the Adamaoua, East and North regions as high risk. Internal displacement caused by armed conflict, other situations of violence or natural disasters has always been seen primarily as a humanitarian and human rights issue, and even as a security challenge. Humanitarian organisations have a key role to play here. Development-oriented organisations tend to intervene on behalf of both themselves and their hosts, thereby fostering peaceful relations. An influx of labour can improve food

International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science (IJLRHSS)
Volume 07 - Issue 02, 2024
www.ijlrhss.com || PP. 163-177

production, and improved health and education services have a lasting impact locally, even when IDPs return home.

3.5. Equality and non-discrimination in the context of neutral humanitarian action

Weaknesses in the civil documentation system pre-existed the crisis, but were exacerbated by forced displacement and the inadequacy of the legal framework. In 2022, protection actors will help nearly 8,000 people to recover civil status documents lost during displacement and will raise awareness among thousands of people of the importance of civil status. The protection response and advocacy will be guided by trends in protection monitoring, which will continue to target some 200,000 people each month to collect data on incidents and refer them to the relevant actors through existing referral channels. Local NGOs will have a key role to play and the Protection Sector in the Far North will continue to support national efforts under the localisation agenda, including through capacity building activities targeting 160 staff of local organisations. The above calls for a focus on the legal protection of IDPs(14).

3.6. Resilience of internally displaced pupils

For Milène Trabelsi and Jean-Luc Dubois, armed conflict not only deepens inequalities between girls and boys, it also destroys physical capital and reduces the human capital built up through years of education, experience and regular health care(20). They make people even more vulnerable and prevent them from fulfilling their potential. Armed conflict slows down development because of the human costs it entails. Death, rape, disability and injury are all immediate consequences of conflict. The collapse of food systems, the disintegration of health and education services and the loss of income, all indirectly linked to the conflict, also have a negative impact on the level of human development. When an initially poor population loses its assets and its ability to pay for healthcare, keep children in school and maintain proper nutrition, the consequences quickly become fatal. The missed opportunities in education in particular are then passed on from generation to generation in the form of illiteracy.

According to IIEP & PME(21) the creation of "safe schools" for children and adolescents due to the complexity of emergency situations in West and Central Africa, UNICEF has developed the regional "safe school" strategy in West and Central Africa, the aim of which is to reduce the loss of human life and damage to infrastructure in the event of attacks on schools or villages. In contexts of high insecurity, the "safe schools" models propose to : Promote children's learning, health and protection; Have a strong conflict and disaster risk reduction component at school or community level; Develop a strong relationship between child protection systems and inside classrooms (education, behaviour change) and around the school (census/orientation); Prioritise psychosocial support in the classroom (19). UNICEF and non-governmental organisations were quick to recognise the scale of the disasters caused by the effects of these wars on the education systems of the countries concerned, particularly for people displaced within or outside their country's borders. As a result, the notion of "educational emergency" was extended to support the consequences of conflicts over a relatively long period, "several years, even several decades" .For these authors, the notion of education in crisis situations has been forged on a set of implicit assumptions that are still very firmly rooted in humanitarian circles, despite the questions that have been raised about them in academic circles and within INEE itself. The first is that education can help save lives by creating safe places where children can be protected from all forms of exploitation and receive psychological support. Although this assumption is regularly challenged both by the facts and by various studies(22).

Cameroon, which has been affected by three crises in the East and Adamaoua, North-West and South-West, and Far-North regions, has recorded more than 1.5 million school-age children among its victims. An estimated 711,056 people have been internally displaced (23). This runs counter to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially Goal 4, which is to "*ensure equal access to quality education for all, and promote lifelong learning opportunities*" by 2030. According to the United Nations, more than 515,000 school-age children affected by the crisis (50% girls) need assistance in the education sector in the departments affected by the Lake Chad Basin crisis (24).

In the Far North, 49,000 Nigerian refugees and 89,000 internally displaced persons are in need of assistance in the education sector. These needs are in addition to those of school-age children in host communities. The humanitarian crisis has had an impact on the education system in these regions for the children of host communities, IDPs and refugees. Existing facilities are often overcrowded (more than 150 children per teacher) and some of the teachers are not sufficiently equipped to manage either large groups or multigrade classes(25) . In its report "*Study on out-of-school children in Cameroon*", UNICEF states that the crises have had a strong impact on access to basic social services, including education and school attendance, affecting already fragile areas where school enrolment rates are among the lowest(26). "*The exactions of the Boko-Haram sect have created fear among the population, who have stopped their activities out of caution.*

Teachers are afraid and don't go to school to teach. When people leave their villages for safe areas, they travel with their children, who drop out of school".In several localities in the Far North, the parents interviewed all cited fear of violence as the reason why their offspring were dropping out of school: "*What parent can agree to their child going to school in these circumstances? My child will go to school, but only when it's calmer*", said one parent (27).

In the surrounding towns hosting the internally displaced students, the impact on education is also noticeable. Many children in Cameroon have not set foot in a classroom for three years. Due to the ban on education by non-state armed groups and attacks, more than 80% of schools have been closed, affecting more than 600,000 children, says the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): "*At least 74 schools have been destroyed, while pupils, teachers and school staff have been exposed to violence, abduction and intimidation. Since 2018, more than 300 students and teachers have been abducted. After traumatic experiences, they have all been subsequently released,*" Fund spokesman Toby Fricker told a press briefing in Geneva. These "internally displaced" children lived in a safe environment that was conducive to their schooling. They lived their own way of life, with familiar friends and teachers. The families, in their own ecological and socio-cultural environment, did what was necessary for their children's integration and education.

There are several reasons why some families take in displaced children. The reasons are linked to the interruption of schooling, the lack of financial support, the act of charity by benefactors to IDP pupils or the family relationship between the IDP pupils and the host families. For some host families, school-age children have the right to go to school. But because of the crises, the schools are closed or destroyed.The lack of financial resources on the part of internally displaced students forces them to stop their studies. In fact, some host families, despite the crowded conditions in which they live, are willing to take in as many pupils as possible, but they do not always have the financial resources to provide schooling for school-age IDPs. This is the case of one informant: "My children are 4, I took 3". In a family with limited resources, they take with them, in addition to the large number of their own children, the displaced children even though they cannot provide them with full support, mainly in terms of education. "*I took 3 but 1 has gone off to wash cars because I can't pay for his schooling*". In order to provide even basic nutrition for these children, some host families receive assistance from close relatives who have stayed behind in other towns or villages. "*Sometimes they send me food from the village; when there's food, we eat, when there isn't, we stay like that*".

Some parents, out of affection for their offspring, respond to their demands by agreeing to take in internally displaced pupils at their request. At first sight, they trust them without thinking about the loss of earnings. This is the case of one of our informants who, at the request of his daughter, preferred to make her room available to IDP students with whom he has no family ties. When his daughter left the family plot, he could have rented out the room on payment of rent. "*I don't know them. My daughter brought them here. She said, 'Dad, I'm not here anymore, so I'd rather give them my room"*. They don't pay the rent. This accommodation is offered to them free of charge.

3.7. Living conditions for a displaced student boarding with a host family
In some host families, people live together in a friendly atmosphere. Although the neighbours are aware of their town of origin and their status as "*displaced persons*", they do not judge them. They are not marginalised or excluded from the neighbourhood children. On the contrary, as our informant said, "*Sometimes when someone is cooking, they help the child. There's solidarity*". The lack of anticipated management of these migratory movements leads to a lack of social stability for internally displaced pupils. Survey results show that they are not always stable in host families. Some move from one family to another. For example, the family who is solely responsible for accommodation is still not interested in their schooling, let alone their enrolment in their school: "*That I don't know; I can't answer that; In fact, I'd have to explain to you, this is not their first residence here. They landed somewhere before coming here. Those are questions about their first arrival*"(28).

The authorities responsible for the integration of IDP pupils could identify the owners of the accommodation and support them so that they provide more accommodation for IDP pupils without paying rent in return, as the successful integration of IDP pupils into their new environment can contribute to better school performance. This explains the fact that, according to our analysis, IDP pupils who were quickly integrated into host families at the start of the crisis are able to adapt more quickly than those who lost several years before being integrated into an educational institution. "*When the war started, we sent for him*". This spontaneity of reception calls into question the quality of the internally displaced pupil.

Relations are mixed between the IDP students and those in charge of the host families. In this case, and in the opinion of the informants, there is real harmony in the cohabitation of the IDP students with the host population, as the informant testifies: "They are very well integrated. They're like our children. There are no problems. As far as schooling is concerned, the host family makes no distinction between IDP children and children living at home. The head of the home makes sure that there is no difference between the education she

gives to her own children and that given to the IDP students in her care. That's all there is to it," she says, "if I don't do the same things for my children at school, I'll do the same things for them. In another case, we observed that there is no real dialogue between the two parties. In the words of one of our interviewees, "*It's the children. I see them as my children. But the little problem I have with them is that when I scold them, they see themselves as if they're not at their mum's, they're being mistreated*".

In the host towns, apart from the refugee camps, there are no accommodation facilities for IDP families, let alone school-age IDP pupils. Everyone is given what accommodation they can. Others are grouped together in the same room with the aim of joining together to pay the rent. The field survey also revealed that for the most part, it is the school-age IDPs who arrived a little earlier and who have rented rooms that house the newly arrived IDPs. In order to perform better at school, the environment of this disadvantaged group must be conducive. But it has to be said that very often they live in precarious conditions that are not conducive to success. The promiscuity of the environment in which they live is not conducive to having an ideal setting in which to study. "*But they're all in the same room. There are others that you will find when you go to carry out the surveys, others there are 5, 6 of them in a room. They make do. Others who have even found a room like this have divided it in two to put the mattress on one side or the mat on the other; they don't have a living room; they cook outside. A child burnt himself here last year; not even one, but two with gas because they weren't used to living like that*".(28).

In a classroom where everyone wears the same uniform, there is no visual identification to show that one pupil is a displaced pupil and another is not. At government level, there are no strategies put in place by those responsible for integrating these children who are victims of social crises to distinguish them from their peers, who can be considered here as "host peers" instead of host families or host parents. For some displaced boarders, the best strategy for integrating them into the new school is to bring them up to standard and get them back into the classroom. However, they are sometimes adamant about going to the next class. It's important to mention that very often, because internally displaced pupils have had a blank year, their parents think they can make up for it by making their children skip classes.

The administrative staff (headmaster) told us about the difficulties encountered in registering internally displaced pupils at the lycée. At the start of the crisis, internally displaced pupils, under instructions from MINESEC, were systematically recruited in the classrooms whenever they arrived at the lycée. From 2016 to 2017, it was still possible to manage. From 2018 onwards, when there began to be a massive influx of internally displaced students, a sort of "mafia" was established in recruitment; informed of the fact that internally displaced students were recruited without any document requirements, even parents living in the town came to present their children as internally displaced students. Despite the addition of classrooms by the government, it is impossible to contain all the numbers. "*All the parents now turn up at the start of the school year saying that their child is an IDP. Some of them we even know well, because their child was at a private college for years, and now they say they're an IDP. We don't even know who's telling the truth anymore; we've got a secondary school to run. If we have to take everyone for free, how are we going to manage?*"This bad practice on the part of parents highlights the dark side of our society and the problem of moral ethics. These actions penalise internally displaced pupils who really need assistance in their vulnerable condition.

The Cameroon government, although financially limited, is making a great effort to meet the needs of all children in Cameroon. In the words of our interviewee: "*That's why we're also here to support the government so that it can meet these needs. For example, the Government of Cameroon has agreed to accept refugee children from the Central African Republic into the education system. There are even some from the Far North*"(29). Externally, socio-political instability in the Central African Republic has led to a growing influx of Central African refugees into Cameroon since 2006. More than 87,000 Central African refugees are present in the East and Adamaoua regions. To these must be added around 8,100 Nigerian refugees in the Far North, whose presence is the result of widespread insecurity in the three Nigerian states bordering Cameroon due to the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. The presence of these refugees, which increases the number of pupils, has put further pressure on existing scarce resources, particularly school resources for children, and further limits access to basic social services in these four regions.

4. Discussion

This section deals with aspects relating to: structuring the State's area of intervention, improving the completion rate for lower secondary education, increasing intake capacity, alternative learning opportunities, teacher training and follow-up for traumatised pupils.Cameroon has been going through a number of political, economic and environmental crises for some time now. The strategies for integrating internally displaced pupils have several focuses, namely: accessibility of the areas where internally displaced pupils are to be accommodated, strengthening of accommodation capacity (construction of classrooms), and increasing the number of trained teaching staff. In other words, as our informant states, "*it's a strategy that will have a*

dimension on access, for example for the areas that receive the most children, we need to strengthen the reception capacities, i.e. build new classrooms, assign newly trained teachers". Given the context, the most important element to be taken into account in these strategies is the socio-cultural aspect, particularly the gender aspect. In fact, according to the figures put forward by the administrative staff, girls account for almost 70% of the internally displaced pupils identified. We live in a context where customs and traditions have a major influence on the education of girls of school age, even when they are not internally displaced pupils.

Very often, the number of displaced people, internally displaced students or refugees from various crisis zones is far greater than the capacity of the school and health facilities in the host localities. To improve access to education for pupils and parents, the strategies implemented by the State of Cameroon include: reinforcing reception structures, in particular by building classrooms, latrines, water points and health facilities. The emphasis should not only be on their education, but also on their state of health. "You have to listen to them. They will tell you how they live. There are others who have lost their feet, who have cysts, who are disabled because of the North-West/South-West war. Because a child who is not healthy, who suffers from an illness, or who is living with a handicap of some kind because of the war, even if they receive all the assistance they need at school, their performance will not be at its best.

Education crisis zones such as the Far North are the main targets of sometimes deadly attacks. For the strategies implemented to be effective, a program to protect internally displaced pupils needs to be devised. Nearly 4,000 schools have been closed since the start of the crises because of insecurity. These days, alternative learning opportunities are UNICEF's main point of support, as our informant said: "*More than 4,000 schools are closed today in the North-West, South-West and Far-North regions because of attacks on schools and because of insecurity. This is where we also support alternative learning opportunities*".Alternative learning opportunities include the radio program. Through this means of communication, lessons are delivered via the media. The lessons are recorded on USB sticks using USB ports. This means that students can follow the lessons even when they are at home. There are also accelerated programs that are not only broadcast on the radio, but also implemented in the regions. These alternative offerings are designed to enable students to integrate both psychologically and physically into the classroom in the same way as host students. These programs also aim to improve the quality of learning by placing particular emphasis on teacher training, subject descriptions and pedagogical supervision. However, this technique of educational resilience in times of crisis is less appropriate in the Far North because of the poor electricity coverage in this part of the country.

Internally displaced pupils need trained, supported and motivated teachers, but those who work with them are too often poorly paid and inexperienced, working in difficult conditions with no opportunities for professional development. By creating a sense of normality and stability, teachers can provide traumatised children and adolescents with a protective shield against conflict and violence. However, programs are needed to prepare them for this role(30).In Cameroon the UN humanitarian response plan published in May 2018 provided $15.2 million to reach 160,000 people, but since then the number of internally displaced people and others in need has increased dramatically. Very few international organisations are present on the ground and those that are have had to prioritise the basic needs of the newly displaced from the limited funds they receive(31).The collaborative strategies put in place between the government of Cameroon and its implementing partners to promote education in the context of the crisis for internally displaced pupils in the towns of the Extreme North are a prerequisite for better integration into the education sector.The socio-institutional measures implemented by the Cameroonian government to ensure the integration of internally displaced pupils into schools are effective, despite structural and financial constraints. The integration of internally displaced pupils from towns or villages in crisis and into host families is underpinned by a variety of motivations (the right to education for all, performing an act of charity for a vulnerable person), and reveals a variety of attitudes towards the people who interact with them. The collaborative strategies observed between the various social actors involved with internally displaced pupils aim to ensure their social integration and quality education.

Conclusion

The results reveal that the reasons for the exodus of internally displaced students are numerous and complex: they range from armed conflicts to structural causes, including discrimination, persecution and poverty. Government funding and funding from international organisations is most often used to support IDPs living in camps. However, IDPs who have found refuge with host families in urban areas do not always receive aid. The Cameroon government has no formal mechanism for managing the flow of students from crisis zones. Having fled the combat zones, leaving everything behind, they are left in a precarious situation. Despite this, parents are doing what they can to meet their primary needs and provide for their children's education. Most of those interviewed deplored the fact that internally displaced students receive no help from the government, other civil societies or NGOs. This could lead to IDP pupils dropping out of secondary schools. It appears that there is no real communication between those involved in supporting displaced pupils. Some actions are carried out in

isolation, without any real coordination. This could lead to duplication. All this gives rise to contradictory views on their integration into the host towns. Future research could explore the impact of the national socio-educational system on the integration of internally displaced pupils in relation to the drop-out rate of these pupils.

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