

Internal Insurgency and National Security in Nigeria: A Re-Examination

Inyang, Bassey (Ph.D)

Centre for General Studies, Cross River University of Technology, Calabar
+234837548368 & +2348178668333
EMAIL; basseyinyang62@yahoo.com

Lemchi Joseph (Ph.D)

Department of History and International Studies,
Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education,
Owerri – Imo State
+2348060234110
EMAIL: Oy169@yahoo.com

Abstract: The internally generated security challenges confronting the Nigerian State in the 21st Century have put the nation under serious threat as a result of the emergence and activities of insurgent groups such as Boko Haram in the North East and militant groups in other parts of the country. The spate of violent attacks by militant, insurgent and terrorist in recent times is characterised by the abduction and killing of people, destruction of churches, mosques, schools and farms which has plunged the country into a chronic state of insecurity. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper explores documentary analysis on the severity of attacks and security challenges on the Nigerian State from insurgency and the impact of this on national security, peace and sovereignty. This calls for appraisal of the insurgency and re-examination of how it affects our national security. The study shows that the frequency and enormity of the terror unleashed by insurgents in various parts of the country resulted to serious damage on the peace, stability, development and sovereignty of the state. It is therefore recommended that if the issues of corruption, unemployment, poverty and bad governance are addressed, then every counter measure undertaken by the Government will be effective. The training and re-training of military personnel in their effective and civilised or disciplined use is also recommended.

Keyword: National Security, Insurgency, Terrorism, Nigerian State, Boko Haram.

Introduction

The nature and concept of insurgency always invoke the spirit of terror which is any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life and rebellion against constituted authority by those who want to undermine the efforts of an incumbent regime. However, it is important to note that issues leading to insurgency are often associated with the people's grief against the state or state institutions. The last decade in Nigeria has experienced an increase in violence conflicts and criminality in the form of human trafficking, arms smuggling, kidnapping, armed robbery, military and youth restiveness among other acts of criminality that undermine human and national security.

Disunity in Nigeria has distorted, complicated and to a large extent stultified every development effort undertaken by government. Even before the Nation gained political independence in 1960, the area today constituting the Federal Republic of Nigeria has had a large number of Christians, Muslims and traditional worshippers living side by side. The country's political independence was won by the forces from adherents of the three major religions in the country. However, recent events points to a situation of controversy about the number of the adherents of these religions. In the 21st century many political and social analysts did not hid their feelings by attributing the insecurity challenges to politics or economic but some are of the view that religious perspective should be added.

Today, more than fifty years after the country's independence, Nigeria is still groping in the dark, searching for the peace and unity that has eluded it as a Nation. Thirteen administrations have tried without success to right the disparate people of Nigeria. Despite these attempts, political, social and economic lives of the people remain at their lowest ebb. In fact, all sorts of ailments have plagued the Nigerian State. Socio-

political upheavals, spiralling urban violence, inter-communal clashes, separatist movements, religious violence, monumental corruption, politically motivated assassinations and so on are common features of the Nation.

In this paper, insurgency applies to somebody or a group of people who rebel against authority or leadership; somebody who belongs to a group involved in uprising that is rebelling against authority or leadership, especially against a country or a ruler of a country.

An insurgent can be a member of a political party who rebels against the party leaderships or policies. It is in line with this activities of some groups such as the 1980 Kano Maitatsine uprising, which ignited violent confrontation between the authorities and the Al-Masifu sect led by Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, that have been described as the curtain raiser for insurgency in Nigeria. From analysis, Boko Haram mission started in the far North-Eastern part of Nigeria and spread quickly to North-central, North-West and by prediction moved to other parts of Nigeria. The local people in the Northern part of Nigeria wonder why the Nigeria state and her security agencies cannot bring to an end this insurgency and violent conflict and criminality committed against innocent citizens.

All given orders of class rule must be secured against insurgency of subject classes. The security of the Nigerian people is paramount and the responsibility that government must not fail to ensure. State security sovereignty politics are concerned with identification, destruction, and containment of threats to orders of class rule. Insurgent subject groups are the targets of state security politics. The armed and security forces of the state are the instituted state security agencies for protecting existing orders of class rule. Security that results in stability of existing class orders is the outcome of effective threat elimination and or containment processes. These processes are conflictual, involving the maintenance of an existing order challenged by insurgent subject groups. The study of state security politics involves invasive penetration of state security, an event considered by the state security operatives as a security threat (Amoda, 2007).

From a descriptive perspective, Boko Haram insurgence started in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria and spread quickly to North-Central, North-West and moved to other parts of the country. People in the country are wondering why the Nigerian state and her security agencies cannot end this insurgency or terror against innocent citizens of Nigeria. Security of Nigeria people is paramount and it is the responsibility that government must not fail to ensure. Mangold (1990:2) views security as a pre-condition of ordered human existence by citing Thomas Hobbs idea that state were found to defend the people "from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one to another and thereby to secure them. Nwozor (2013) views Nigeria's security management from the dimension of pro-realist orientation that deploys forces to combat attacks for the survival of the state.

Theoretical Framework

Criminal motivation is a product of one or more of a complex set of factors. Such factors which include "Individual background, social control, social-structural and cultural changes affect the rate of crime in any given society" (Conklin, 2001). With the advent of information and communication technology, criminal activities have become more sophisticated, more daring and adaptable with global reach. Criminal theorising therefore has spanned paradigms, theories and framework, such that no single theory of crime causation can explain with complete accuracy the factors that kick-start and or sustain criminal vocation. Despite such short coming, three related theories: the general theory of strain, the dynamic legitimization theory, and the crime pattern theories are adopted here to guide our discussion. As Eck and Weisburd (1995) explain, theories of crime can be divided into those that seek to explain the development of offenders, and those that seek to explain the development of criminal events. The three theories have profound influence on the discussion of emergence of criminals and crime patterns. The weaknesses of each of the theory are compensated for by the strength of others (Andrew, 1980; Matsueda, 1988; Iwarimic – Jaja, 1999).

The crime pattern theory emerged as a combination of rational choice theory and routine activity theory by Eck and Weisburd (1995) to explain the distribution of crimes across places. In its original form, the rational choice theory with its neo-classical background argues that the motivation to commit crime originates from individual free will or choice and that the criminal is capable of weighing many factors before he/she launches into criminal operation. Among such factors are crime targets and the means to commit an offence (Cornish and Clark, 1986). In other words, criminals make rational choice about whom, where, how and against whom they commit an offence. For the routine activity theorists, crime requires a confluence of motivated offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Building upon these two theories, the crime pattern theorists argue that the manner, in which victims and location come to the attention of offenders, influences the distribution of crime events over time and space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993). They argue that rational offenders, while engaging in their routine activities, will note places without guardians or managers. The theory therefore concerns itself with the interaction of offenders and their physical and social environment.

The concept of place therefore becomes essential to crime pattern theory, for not only are places logically required for a criminal event but the characteristics of a place may influence the likelihood of a crime occurring (Eck and Weiburd, 1995). For instance, the socio-economic and political activities surrounding a place interact simultaneously with the physical environment of a place to influence the probability of a crime occurring. On the Nigerian situation, criminologists have pointed to widespread poverty, unemployed and greed (Dambazau et al., 1996, Saad 2009), weak institutional and moral values, weak and corrupt criminal justice system (Shehu, 2006; Alemika and Chukwuma, 2001) and widespread inequalities (Iwarime – Jaja, 1999). In the face of rapid social change driven by technological innovation and globalization coexisting with a social-cultural political and economic environment laden with corruption, crime and criminals tend to thrive.

Using a constructive theory of global security, Buzan (1983:27) analyses the war against terrorism regardless of whether or not the terrorists see themselves for contending for political power. The author frowned at the use of terror, such as bombing or hijackings to pressure, weaken or discredit a government. To him, individuals face random risk of victimization because of others dispute about the nature or control of state policy. According to him, terrorism, like other forms of political violence, not only undermines the individuals security directly, it is likely also to increase the threats to individual security offered by the state itself, as well as those coming from other states. He argued further that by undermining trust in the state's capacity to provide domestic security, terrorists can force the state to make its security measures more obtrusive. This process has been much enhanced by the actual and potential danger of terrorists acquiring high technology weapons.

The Nature and Dimensions of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria

Conflict systems in Nigeria could be construed as a dramatic and extreme manifestation of what has been termed "manifest conflict processes, a situation in which at least two actors or their representatives try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining directly or otherwise, the goal-seeking capability of one another" (Sandole, 1986).

Containment or management of conflict entails an understanding of its nature "before we can deal effectively with it; intellectually, emotionally and behaviourally". This involves a critical appraisal of both the structural conditions and the psycho-cultural factors which sustain the scale and intractability of conflict vortex in Warri, Delta State of Nigeria. The structural conditions direct attention to forces which "can make a society more or less prone than another to particular levels and forms of conflict and violence". The psycho-cultural dispositions determine the overall level of conflict in a society in terms of shared assumptions, perceptions and images, about what "people in a society value, their definition of friends or foes", and the means which groups and individuals use to promote or pursue their goals. In other words, structural analysis of conflict, violence and warfare focus on how the organization of society shapes action, whereas psycho-cultural explanations" look to the actors themselves and how they interpreted the world" (Ross, 1993).

In Nigeria, conflicts range from communal bloody clashes over land to intra-clan violent disputes over succession to traditional throne. A current survey of all these conflict developments reveal a disturbing pattern of accelerating rise in the intensity or scale of violence arising from dwindling capital resources (land), demographic explosion, social fragmentation and decay, between ethnic groups, economic and political marginalization and repression and politicisation of religion. The violent conflicts that have troubled Nigeria include ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, political conflicts, terrorism, militancy, youth restiveness, electoral violence and the like. From Nigeria's independence until now the country's story is coloured by conflicts, violence, warfare and turbulence. Other conflicts that have bedevilled the country include the communal mayhem in Warri, Ife-Modakeke conflict, the Tiv-Jukun Fulani conflict (2003), Jos Mayhem, the Aguleri-Umuleri, the Zango-Kataf, Igbede-Emede, the Kano Manitasaine conflicts (1980), religious riot in Kaduna (Sharia), factional strife in Obudu and Ekor over succession (to traditional throne), youth restiveness and militancy in the Niger Delta, for self-determination and resource control and political gangsterism for control of local government councils and terror upsurge from Boko-Haram and many others. Other conflicts that have troubled Nigeria are the 1991 and 2000-2001 conflicts in Bauchi State, conflicts in Burutu local government area of Delta State, conflicts in Okitipupa area of Ondo State, the 1999-2000 conflicts in Kano State, the conflicts in Gwatu, Kaduna State in 2001, the 2000 conflict in Kaduna metropolis, the Yan Tatsine riots in the early 1980s, the Yoruba land in Western Nigeria between 1960 and 1966, the Nigerian Civil War, the post election crisis of 2011, ethno-religious massacre in Kano, Kaduna and Plateau in wake of Sharia judicial system, Nupe-Yoruba conflict in Kwara and the Boko Haram insurgency, (Badru, 1998:4, cited in Tijani, 2010:187-220; Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009:7-14). To most outsiders, the name Nigeria conjures up images of chaos and confusion, military coups, repression, drug trafficking and business fraud. The cost, effects, impact and consequences of violent conflicts and warfare on human persons, social life, political arena, and economy are well documented. Violent conflicts are conflicts in which one or both of the parties involved in a dispute,

disagreement and struggle over resources, services, exchange of goods, or on which position or decision should be taken; takes up arms or other material or non-material elements to do harm to the other in order to be victorious in the struggle. Nonmaterial implies doing harm and destructive through hate speech or other spiritual means.

The overall conclusion from current strategic conflict assessment report is, therefore, apposite in the array of conflict in Nigeria is “bewildering, the intensity of the violence often stunning”. Few years after the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria, armed confrontations have erupted throughout the country over such issues as religion, economic power and division of wealth, land, renewable natural resources, including livestock forage, woodstocks and fisheries, environmental damage, labour management relations, urban disputes among youth gangs, disputes among youths of rural communities and police – related violence (Bassey, 2007). These conflicts have been generally considered symptoms of the deep and unsettled condition of Nigeria. In such a condition, the nexus of completion, cooperation and consensus are part of the same process of conflict identification and their resolution transformation and management.

Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria

Insurgency is an ambiguous concept. The United States Department of Defence (2007) defines it as organised movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed conflict. This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existing government for the control of power sharing (Siegel, 2007:328). Contemporary discussions on Nigeria is almost inevitably replete with issues surrounding insecurity, militancy, insurgency and terrorism, due to the linkages with economic, social, political and governance activities, with spiralling effects on regional and international relations (Adewumi, 2014). There have been upsurge in violent conflicts in Nigeria with Boko Haram being in the forefront since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule. The Boko Haram insurgency poses a threat to national security. However, it should be noted that the concept of national security, in the post war era, has gone beyond securing lives and properties of the people through the protection of territorial integrity of the state against threats of external aggressors (Adedoyin, 2013:455).

Security is a state of being safe and the absence of fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression. It is the preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these values. Imobighe (1990:224), opines that security is the freedom from threats and a Nation’s capability to defend and develop itself, promote its values and lawful interests. For Zabadi (2005:3), security is a state in which people or things are not exposed to the dangers of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or decline. This view is associated with the survival of the state and the preservation of its citizens. In other words, the state has the responsibility of the use of force and power for the safety of its territory and its people. Held et al (1998:226) describe national security as “the acquisition, deployment and use of military force to achieve national goals”. Romm (1993) describes it as the lack of danger or risk to held standards, values and ideas and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked now or in the future. Thus, national security is the preservation of the values a nation holds as it relates to the defence of its territory from human as well as non-human threats. The values also guide in the pursuit of its national interest in the international system.

The phenomenon of ethnicity and religious intolerance has led to incessant recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have birthed copious ethnic militias like the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) the Igbo People Congress (IPC), the O’dua People Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) among others (Salawu, 2010:345-353). The two most notorious terrorist groups that have challenged Nigeria’s national security, territoriality, sovereignty and unity have been the Niger Delta militant group and Boko Haram.

The conflict in the Niger Delta region could be linked to the long years of abandonment, environmental degradation, coupled with the inconsiderateness of successive governments and exploitation by the oil companies and linked to the denial of the ontological needs of the people and complicated by the communal content, governance of the state and international linkages. These produced a capricious atmosphere in the 1990s characterised by frustration, anger and aggression that manifested in constitutional and violent protests and conflicts in the region (Folarin and Okodua, 2010). It transcends the conception of conflict simply as the fear of the past, lived in the present, it is an engrained and habitual consciousness of deprivation. The agitation by the community development committees of the host communities started with a peaceful protest to the multinational oil companies. The agitations were heightened by the massacre of the nine Ogoni leaders and Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha the then military head of state. By 1998, anarchy overwhelmed most of Niger Delta region because where dialogue and constitutional means for seeking redress failed, then violent confrontation became inevitable as a form of expression.

Buzan (1991:19) identifies five areas of threat to the security of human collectivities. These are military, political, economic, societal and environmental. The conflict in the Niger Delta fits Buzan's classification. It includes crises of confidence owing to protracted failure of the state to deliver the dividends of governance, dissatisfaction with the prevailing revenue allocation regime, hence the demand for resource control, increasing poverty and disease occasioned by exploration-related environmental degradation, military and non-military threats to personal and communal security, disregard for minority identity, and desecration of indigenous values and cultures, youth alienation and loss of self-esteem and denial of access to economic opportunities and exclusion from mainstream political participation.

The crisis in the Niger Delta has become more or less intractable and seems to have assumed a life of its own as various militant groups emerge to pursue the resource control cause, all under the umbrella of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah. Other belligerent groups were the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the Martyrs Brigade, the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, and the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) among others (Duru, 2012: 162-170). The underlying issues of contention by the armed militant groups were the greater control of the oil resources in the Niger Delta region by the people, fair allocation of the revenue from oil exploitation, ending the oil spills and gas flaring, compensation for the decades of ecocide, as well as the physical and infrastructural development of the region. However, the Nigerian government saw their protests as acts of sabotage to the revenue generation of the nation (Cyril, 2008). In reality, interval security has been significantly undercut by violent activities of civilian-in-arms against the Nigerian State. Apart from the problems in the Niger Delta, other causes of militancy in the region included, marginalization, abject poverty, unemployment, destruction of aquatic ecosystem, the alteration of soil quality, air pollution, and socio-economic disorganisation (Nwogwugwu, Alao and Egwuonwu, 2012:23-37). The activities of the group in the Niger Delta manifested in diverse ways such as militancy, kidnapping, killings, bombing, hostage taking, demolition of oil and gas facilities, pipeline vandalisation, illegal oil bunkering (Duru 2012: 162-170). Between 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage incidents were recorded in the region (Ogbonnaya and Ehiginamusoe, 2013: 46-60). The sophistication of the weapons plus the dexterity of operation questioned the security of the Nigerian State. Despite the seeming prevailing calmness of the region at the moment, as regards the issue of terrorism, the outstanding issues of resource control and allocation, poverty alleviation and environmental security remain potential sources of explosive situations. Incidentally, while the amnesty for, and rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants were beginning to mitigate the situation in the country, the Boko Haram insurgency began.

The Boko Haram Insurgency

Boko Haram as used in this work refers to the religious sect whose group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". It earned its nickname Boko Haram from the teachings of its founder Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s in the restive North-eastern city of Maiduguri, capital of Borno State. The word 'Boko' (Arabic) means sin or forbidden. Hence, interpretation of Boko Haram in Hausa Language is "western education is sin" (Gilbert, 2014). In a sense it could be argued that Boko Haram started as a fundamental Islamic sect that intends to supplant government structures that politicised, corrupted and bastardised proper implementation of Sharia in the North, and to install Islamic regime where Sharia law will be applied to the letters (Idowu, 2013: 86). But with the thousands of people killed and properties destroyed, their objectives remain largely unknown and hitherto their insurgency has intensified. The massive killings and damage on properties has contradicted what their name stands for, that is opposing anything that was concerned with western education. Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws as set out in the Koran (Walker, 2012).

The conscription of their members has been encouraged by, poverty, unemployment, continuous strikes, cult activities and many youths have left school to join them. Olojo, (2013) states that brutal radicalism; enrolment and support for Boko Haram have been significantly driven by economic deprivation. Idowu (2013) further attributed the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency to ethnicity, poverty/inequality, crises of the state, political culture and institution, and foreign influences. The effects of the insurgency are devastating and far reaching. Despite the massive loss of lives and properties, it has worsened the economic situation of the country as investors are no longer investing but rather divesting, it has sowed the seed of distrust, antagonism and disunity between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, massive depopulation of the North and overcrowding of the South is evident. Nigerians have come to realise that the terror group is indeed a threat to the security, sovereignty and stability of the Nigerian state and not just the North. The implication of Boko Haram's operation include the slowdown of the country's economic growth and development, worsened unemployment,

food scarcity due to the inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South due to insecurity reasons, dented Nigeria's public image, increased fear and a false sense of security.

The Boko Haram attacks raises question on the problem of security in Nigeria and the impact on West African countries. Northedge F. S. (1976) maintains that security of the people is regarded as the supreme law, while defence and survival is the very core of external policy, which makes the search for security to become one of the key determinants of relationship among states. The threats of Boko Haram on the Nigerian people is a huge concern to all the security agencies from the several and series of bombings and killings within the metropolis and some rural communities and national boundaries – a threat to the overall national security of the country. Boko Haram severe attacks had caused the Nigerian government to take to collaborate with her immediate neighbours as a necessary response to trans-border crimes and illegal movement of weapons. She entered into Trans-border security cooperation agreement with Cameroon and Joint Security Patrol agreement with Benin Republic as well as the Multi-National Joint Task Force Agreement comprising Nigeria, Niger Cameroon and Chad. Intelligent reports have continued to point the ways of Nigeria's neighbours as places of harbouring cells linked with distant terrorist organizations (Guardian, January 6, 2013:3). Akinterinwa (2014:51) maintains the accusation that Boko Haram has operation bases in neighbouring countries but they did not attack those countries. He explains further that if those countries are condoning their military and operational bases from which they attack Nigerian people, that raises question about the international responsibility of the neighbouring countries (Guardian, March 1, 2014:51). In all, Boko haram insurgency has negative impact on the human security of the Nigerian citizens. It is therefore evident that as Boko Haram insurgency has claimed lots of lives, aggravated the food and nutrition insecurity, further damaged to health and education sector and has caused general fear and anxiety, an urgent solution is needed as Boko Haram is a threat to human and National security in Nigeria.

Managing and Combating Insurgency/Terrorism

What is important about conflict is not its occurrence as such, but how the parties attempt to deal with it. Unfortunately, in concrete policy terms, conflict developments in Nigeria have been treated by relevant Federal and State authorities as a security problem to be ruthlessly contained or suppressed. In the process, the root of the problem remained unaddressed, risking a capricious resurgence in a later date as in the Boko Haram insurgence. The regularity and enormity of the terror unleashed by insurgents in various parts of the country make it expedient for strategies and solutions to the phenomena. There is no doubt that the government has an immediate responsibility to protect life and property by taking immediate action through its security forces to contain exploding conflict situation such as the Boko Haram. There is the need to tow the path of countries in the industrialised world, particularly those who have gathered enough experience in the course of the fight against international terrorism by building a potent Intelligence Gathering Infrastructure that will help in curbing crime. Lack of commitment, wrong prioritisation of public policy and corruption may have slowed down the implementation of this promising plan. However, Nigeria should endeavour to intensify its intelligence gathering technology.

But for a lasting peace to occur, government efforts need to go beyond such initial phase of containing smouldering trouble-spots by investing in conflict transformation activities through civil society proto-regimes (Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) specialising in conflict management such as CRESNET (Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network) and AAPW (Academic Associates Peace Work). This is so because official government responses in conflict flash-points, (troop deployment and judicial arbitration) have tended to be incomplete, indecisive and inconclusive. Boko Haram insurgence has claimed lots of lives and has caused general fear and anxiety and so, a programme of action geared towards the empowerment of institutions and associations of civil society and community based organisations with the requisite knowledge and practical skills in a variety of conflict management process is required.

Since conflict is endemic and the possibility of its eradication unlikely, the best government and civil institutions can hope for, is its localization, containment and transformation through viable conflict management regimes. This requires going beyond formal responses by government to contain the terrorist or insurgent activities. The government should wake up to its socio-economic responsibilities. If it has performed socio-economic responsibilities, the government should embark on social welfare programmes and education especially in the North, to de-radicalise the youth and counter their violent extremist ideology. Nigeria is ravaged by illiteracy, underdevelopment, unemployment, corruption, increased cost of living and poverty, lack of social amenities etcetera, all of which have instigated grievances against the system and created breeding ground for terrorism. If the issues of corruption, unemployment, poverty and bad governance are addressed, then every counter measure undertaken by the Government will be effective.

The development of adequate training and capacity building programmes and the development of strategic team building capacity for identifying strategic agents of change complements modern equipment. Once intelligence infrastructure and military hardware are provided, training of military personnel in their effective and civilised or disciplined use is also required. Media reports have shown how low the moral of the troops has been in regards to the inferior weapons and poor training they go through. These have caused poor motivation and weak response up to the point of flight in the face of superior threat from Boko Haram Fighters (Folarin, 2014). According to Akande (2014), the insurgent have higher moral than the Nigerian troops because they are more organised and have more sophisticated weapons. And so, selection into the security organizations should be entirely based on merit, mental and emotional strength of the individual applicants and physical stability or strength, given the vital role the armed forces play in securing the country.

However, the government had developed military and non-military approaches to counter the insurgency after declaration of state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (Guardian, June 20, 2013). The attendant deployment of the military to these states to carry out emergency order empowers them to take all necessary action within the ambit of their rule of engagement, to put an end to the impunity adopted by insurgents on innocent civilians. The Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 was issued and Gazette as the Terrorism (Prevention) (proscription order) notice 2013. This brings the activities of Boko Haram within the purview of the Terrorism Prevention Act and any persons associated with the group can now be legally prosecuted and sentenced as specified by the Act.

Penalties prescribed by the act, as detailed in order include a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years for any persons who knowingly in any manner, directly or indirectly, solicits or renders support for the commission of an act of terrorism or to a terrorist group as spelt out in section 5 (1) of the Act. The Act also defines support means, dissemination of terrorist information and provision of material assistance to terrorists among others (cited in Guardian, June 20, 2013:14). All insurgents and terrorists caught or who surrendered must to be fully prosecuted and adequately punished to serve as deterrence to others.

However, as a panacea to peace, the United States of America offer \$7million (about 1.1 billion naira) for the capture of the leader of the sect, AbubakarShekaur and the official proscription of the sect by the Nigerian government, declaring them a terrorist group. Again, at the 45th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Accra, Ghana, there call for direct regional confrontation of the menace of insurgency in Nigeria. ECOWAS members assured the Nigerian government of its continued support and solidarity in combating the menace of terrorism. The wakeup call is that Nigeria should not be abandoned in the fight against terrorism as Nigeria since independence have spent over \$13 billion on peace keeping effort in West Africa (Ogbogbo, 2014). For government to curb insurgency, the SURE-P (subsidy re-investment & empowerment programme) policies should be reinvigorated, monitored and well implemented to achieve the desired goals.

Conclusion

The main thrust of this paper is that from the numerous cases of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, it is obvious that insecurity beclouds the Nigerian State. The state's monopoly of the use of force has been shattered by desperate terrorist and insurgent groups pursuing parallel goals to that of the state. Although the term insurgency and terrorism have been interchangeably used in this paper, it is pertinent to state that insurgency is a struggle for self-determination, which is a more legal and acceptable kind of struggle in a sovereign state. Insurgency is not terrorism, subversion, guerrilla war, conventional war, revolution, coup d'état (Liolio, 2014; Curts, 2006), although some insurgent groups have adopted some of their methods in the achievement of their goals. While terrorism is unconventional, vicious and endless because there are no rooms for negotiations and no arrowheads to spearhead dialogue. Niger Delta militancy was a form of insurgency, while Boko Haram is a terrorist group.

It is my earnest postulation that in curbing the Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria, the government should strengthen their collaboration with the global community in combating these criminal activities. Resolving conflict and peace building measures that concentrates on physical and material needs may provide necessary but not sufficient long-term relieve to communities in traumatic social and ideological conflict. The genocidal impulses unleashed on the Nigerian communities' forewarn of the imperative need for psychological reorientation and engineering of social consciousness in the existential context of destructive communal mayhem. However, the tireless effort of the Nigerian military in spite of all odds would go a long way in curtailing the obnoxious and nefarious activities of this monstrous group to an end one day. Again, our porous borders should be under strict control to prevent illegal immigrants from entering into Nigeria and our military should never rest on their oars when it comes to the issue of national security. The time to stop this mayhem in Nigeria is now.

References

- [1]. Adedoyin, A. (2013) Human Security Factor in Agricultural Transformation in Nigeria. In Isaac Olawale Albert (Eds.) *The Security Sector and Conflict Managements in Nigeria*. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
- [2]. Adewumi A. (2014) *The Battles of the Minds: The Insurgency in Northern Nigeria*. West Africa Insight. Boko Haram.
- [3]. Akinterinwa, B. (2014) "Boko Haram is not only a Nigeria problem. Nigeria is just a platform for their activities. *The Guardian*, Friday, March 1.
- [4]. Amoda, J. M. (2007) *Methodological Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies* in Bassey C. & Oshita Oshita: *Conflict Resolution, Identity Crisis and Development in Africa*. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited.
- [5]. Andrew, D. A. (1980) Some Experimental Investigation of the Principles of Differential Association through Deliberate Manipulation of the Structure of Service System. *American Sociology Review*, 45, 448-462.
- [6]. Bassey, C. O. (2007) Epidemiology of conflict and violence in Nigeria. In Celestine Bassey & Oshita Oshita (2007) *Conflict Resolution, Identity Crisis and Development in Africa*. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited.
- [7]. Buzaan, B. (1991) "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century" *International Affaris*, Volume 67, No. 3.
- [8]. Buzan, B. (1983) *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations*. New York: Harvester Wheat Sheaf.
- [9]. Cohen, L. E. & Felson M. (1979) Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach. *American Sociology Review*, 44, 558-605.
- [10]. Conklin, J. E. (2001) *Perspectives on Offending Criminology (7thed)* London Alyn and Bacon. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- [11]. Curtas, S. D. (2006). *A New Type of Insurgency? A Case Study of the Resistance in Iraq*. Graduate Thesis and Dissertation. Scholar Commons, University of South Florida.
- [12]. Cyril, I. O. (2008) *Understanding the Complex Drivers of Conflict*. Lecture Series on African Security.
- [13]. Dambazau, A. B. (1999) *The Growth of Crime, Its Prevention and Control in Nigeria*. In A. B. Dambazau, M. Jumare and A. M. Yakubu (eds). *Issues in Crime Prevention and Control in Nigeia* (pp. 1-9) Baraka Press.
- [14]. Duru, E. J. C. (2012). *The Poverty of Crisis Management in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria; A Focus on the Amnesty Programme* *African Research Review: An International Multidisciplinary Journal*, Ethiopia 6(2): 162-170.
- [15]. Eck, J. E. and Weiburd, D. (1995). *Crime Places in Theory*, New York: Criminal Justice Press.
- [16]. Folarin, S. (2014). *Still on the War of Terror*, *National Mirror*, August 17, 2014.
- [17]. Folarin, S. and Okodua, H. (2010). *Petroleum, the Environment, and the Economics of Nationalism in the Niger Delta*. Lanham, Maryland: Littlefield; Rowman Littlefield Publishing Group.
- [18]. Gilbert, L. (2014). *Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: The International Dimensions*. *Research in Humanities and Social Sciences*. 4, (18): 9-18.
- [19]. Held, D. and McGrew A. (1998) *The End of the Old Order? "Review of International Studies"*, No. 24, pp.219-243.
- [20]. Hellesen, P. (2008) *Counterinsurgency and its Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces*. A Thesis for the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey. pp.14.
- [21]. Idowu, J. (2013). *Resolving and Preventing the Spread of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria*. Ibadan Journal of Peace and Development.2, University of Ibadan.
- [22]. Imobighe, T. A. (1990). *Doctrine for and Threats to Internal Security, in Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems*, eds. A. E. Ekoko and M. A. Vogt, Nigeria: Lagos.
- [23]. Iwarimie-Jaja, D. (1999) *Criminology: The Study of Crime* Port Harcourt: S. J. Publishers.
- [24]. Liolio, S. (2014) *Rethinking Insurgency: A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria*; A Thesis Submitted to the European Peace University, Austria.
- [25]. Matsueda, R. L. (1988). *The Current State of Different Associations*. *Crime and Delinquency*, 34, 277-306.
- [26]. Nwozor, A. (2013) *National Security: Religions Anarchism and the Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria*.

- [27]. Ogbonnaya, U. M. & Ehigiamusoe, U. K. (2013) Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency: National Security in Nigeria. *Global Security Studies Summer*, 4(3):46-60.
- [28]. Ogbogbo, O. (2014) ECOWAS Leaders Silent on Fronted Regional Confrontation of Insurgency in Nigeria. *Guardian: Lagos* July 15, pp. 11.
- [29]. Ojie, A. E. & Ewhrudjakpor, (2009) Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy in Nigeria. *Anthropologist*, 11(1): 7-14.
- [30]. Romm, J. J. (1993) *Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspect*, New York.
- [31]. Sa'ad, A. M. (2009) Juvenile Justice in S. A. Abdullahi, I. Z. Mohamed & C. Casey (Eds) *Studies in Cultural Sociology* (pp. 74-83) Ibadan: Foludex Press.
- [32]. Shehu, A. Y. (2006) *Economic and Financial Crimes in Nigeria: Policy Issues and Options*. Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria.
- [33]. Tijani, K. (2010) "Future Dynamics of Good Neighbourliness or a Future Source of Threat: Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbour in Osita, C. E. (ed.) *Beyond 50 years of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Pp. 187-220.
- [34]. Walker, A. (2012) What is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace Special Report 308 June. Retrieved from <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.PDF>.
- [35]. Zabadi, S. I. (2005) *Understanding Security and Security Sector Dynamics*, Baltimore.