

Philosophy Nicholas Hartmann and research problems of modern culture

*... was leicht zu widerlegen ist,
dessen Sinn liegt nicht in Widerlegbaren¹.*
N. Hartmann

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Abstract: The article analyzes the main provisions of N. Hartmann's philosophy, in the context of the problems of modern culture research. Based on the fundamental work on H. Hartmann's "Problems of Spiritual Being", two aspects are singled out which can be the most productive for the modern philosophy of culture: methodological and ontological.

Key words: philosophy of culture, ontology, spiritual being, methodology.

1. Introduction

The epigraph of this study is the statements of N. Hartmann about the philosophy of Hegel's history, and this epigraph fits for the philosophy of N. N. Hartmann himself. The traditional nature of the research, which is reflected both in the structure of research and in the careful and systematic processing of the material, refers us to German idealism or even to Aristotle rather than talking about philosophy appeared in the twentieth century. And Hartmann's approach and the principles of his philosophy are very traditional. The philosopher generally speaks of the creation of a new or critical ontology, to which his four main studies are devoted, consistently developing ontology as the science of "being as such", following Aristotle's definition. However, N. Hartmann's philosophy is one of the most "sensitive", accurately reacting to modern changes in both culture and science, as evidenced by his interpretations of the Einstein SRT, the philosophy of biologists, and the fourth volume of ontology is generally devoted to the philosophy of nature. The concept of "layers of life", the delineation the categories of cognition and categories of being makes it possible to assess not only modern science, but also to better understand the current state of culture.

2. Some provisions of the ontology of N. Hartmann.

To understand the specifics of N. Hartmann's approach to the problems of spiritual being, it is necessary to clarify the main points of his ontology, because it is precisely in the his "new" ontology he developed that the methodological potential and methodological procedures that N. Hartmann uses to analyze the main philosophical themes are concluded: in ethics, in aesthetics, in the philosophy of history (the problem of spiritual being), in logic (lost), in science (the philosophy of biology, the fourth volume of the ontology of Philosophy of Nature, etc.). etc.

How is a "new" ontology possible? Where does it originate from? The beginning is on this side of realism and idealism. It is necessary to avoid prejudging the question of the being of what exists, says the philosopher, and follow the "natural" course of things. The existence of being is something common to all that exists. The procedure and stages of progress toward ontological thinking are realized with a natural (not reflexive) attitude:

Ordinary thinking: I look at the things that surround me, while I'm interested in things themselves. I am interested in their quality for the purpose of curiosity, use or research. The object dictates the approach to itself, its very device forces to develop methods of its use. I have been already with the subject and I do not doubt in his being or his qualities [1, p.163].

Scientific thinking: I also do not doubt the existence of things, but in them I seek a regular and common. Even if I do not directly perceive the subject of scientific research, I do not doubt that this object

¹ ... which is easily refute, the meaning of that lies not in the refutable (the author's translation). (N. Hartmann 1946 «Das Problem des geistigen Sein»)

exists as something that essentially does not differ from perceived things. I can verify their existence by means of devices or devices of the real world [1, p.164].

Ontological thinking: in part, everyday and scientific thinking is already ontological. They think of an object always in its being. Their focus on what is always already involves the acceptance of being. In the first case, we are interested in things in their primary given; in the second - in their relationship; and in the third - in their being. But what does this mean "in their being"? Is it possible to trace the movement from the particular to the general? From things in their individuality, through things in their qualitative community, to things in their total community; In this case, the course must also be from things of material to other kinds of being that have a different mode of being than the things of the world? So, how do we come to the concept of ontology, do we change our natural attitude? It should be remembered that this is still the beginning of an ontology, or whether it is possible to do without reflection starting think on the basis of what is given. Can I find the being in the object? Hartmann, on the fact that the matter is exactly the reverse: without being I can not think of a thing, it is always given in my being.

But let's take a closer look. So, before us is a thing. To begin with, we establish that this is a thing given in reality. Here I am pointing to it. What most common can I distinguish in it? I can distinguish it from other things, as well as from the space of its surroundings. I can do this due to the presence of the qualities of a thing, which I can identify by means of perception. Here is the billiard ball. Already the fact that he got into the field of my attention speaks from the fact that it possesses qualities that at the given moment and in this space are inherent only to its. Even if there is another ball next to it, it is still not in the same place. We are told that the totality of its essential characteristics is its definition. Theoretically, the totality of all the features would be a "full definition". The number of signs depends on the "depth of knowledge" of the subject. Traffic on the signs will be from more individual to more general. This ball has such a hue of white, just such a weight, such flaws and such a structure. The difference arises: there is a ball "as such" and there is this "this", a specific ball. The first corresponds to the definitions through the signs, the second to the indication that it is. It would seem that a complete definition is equal to its being, however Hartmann affirms that here-being and so-being are indifferent to each other. That they make sense even without each other. It seems that here-being corresponds to the sphere as such, but not so-being, and so-being corresponds to the "given" ball, but it is impossible to find it in it. In fact, Hartmann affirms, and in the first and second case there is also here-being and so-being. But how is this possible? How is the world based on the diversity of its manifestations?

We give the general scheme of the division of manifestations of being. The first division: here-being and so-being; the second - the ways of being: the ideal and real being; further modality of being - possible, actual and necessary and negative modes [2]. So, as here-being and so-being are inherent in both the ideal and the real, both possible and actual. The ideal can be both possible and actual as well as real. We remind that we are talking about the being of being or about what exists as such. But the philosopher affirms, we can not grasp the being of being in its wholeness and completeness. The pure essence as such in its fullness can not be known, but is only knowable in part, through its (essence) certainty. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the specifics of existence - this research will be an ontology (new or critical). But do we not miss, in this way, the radicalities, and in fact the meaning of the whole study of being, in general, transforming philosophy as thinking about principles into a kind of science about concrete (is it concrete and universal enough)? Is the "fundamental ontology" of M. Heidegger more preferable? But this issue is not the subject of our research. It is noted enough to address directly to the questions of spiritual being (history and culture) as they were developed by Hartmann.

3. Problems of spiritual being.

How is history possible? How is historical knowledge possible? How historicity is possible? After all, "history is a spiritual form in which culture is aware of its past" [3, p.114]. The formation of culture is impossible without a record of its past. But how is this report possible? Nominally, by culture, we mean both what a person creates and what a person exists in: culture is the result of activity and the environment of existence. This is unspeakably nothing significant about culture. The definition of culture (always not full and incomplete) can only follow as one of the results of the study, and the result is not a key one. More important than the definition of culture as a concept is the designation of the subject and problem in modern culture. The source of the formation method of investigation becomes also understandable: the subject itself is dictated by the method of its investigation. "Methodology is an epigonese thinking" [4, p.31] - thinking proceeding from the arising method, and not from the given subject. Significant methods arose as hardly conscious tools of research, as their creators proceeded from the field of information. Both Kant and Hegel, like Bohr and Einstein, developed their methods in direct connection with the subjects of research. Borrowing methods does not give the desired results, and leads only to confusion.

In general, in culture, we can comprehend the historical in it, while modern we can more likely describe or at best "diagnose". And all this leads to a question that is similar to questions in transcendental

philosophy: how are humanities possible? Or on another: whether there can be a knowledge in the humanities actually scientific? Perhaps the rigor, clarity and validity that embodied in the natural sciences in the humanities can not be achieved? Or should the scientific criterion itself be expanded, and does not seek to imitate some sciences by others? Such questions began to arise at the end of the XIX century and were most clearly reflected in the philosophy of V. Dilthey. If natural sciences rely on empirical data, then humanitarian ones should be based on experiences. Life (human) is an element that does not have definite goals, therefore history can be understood only in its most closed manifestations, epochs, periods, etc. The history data should be understood and interpreted, which was what descriptive psychology, and then hermeneutics, V. Dilthey. In the context of this study, we must record the very attempt at a strictly disciplinary division of the humanities (the sciences of the spirit) and the natural sciences, as well as the justification for the possibility of the former.

But what is spirit? Or more specifically: what is an objective spirit? As is known, the concept of an objective spirit was developed by G. V. F. Hegel. To continue the study, it is necessary at least in general to identify the main provisions on the objective spirit of Hegel. As noted by R. Breil: «Gehlle's doctrine of the objective spirit is given in Hartmann through a realistic perspective, cleared of all idealistic definitions and reduced to the content-material core» (the author's translation) [5, p. 5-6]. But first it should be noted that for the study of Hartmann's "Problems of Spiritual Being", the initial ones are just the research of V. Dilthey, and on the other hand the philosophy of the objective spirit of Hegel. In the introduction, Hartmann shows 12 theses of Hegel's philosophy of history from which the most important for us are the following:

- From the first thesis: the bearer of the historical process is the "objective spirit", this universal spirit-substance is superior to the individual person, possessing his own way of being and his own life [4, p. 6].
- From the second thesis: the spirit is everything; it grows in a person reaching consciousness, but still not perfect among the set of individual [4, p. 7].
- From the third thesis: the universal spirit-substance is not only the bearer, but also the one who controls the historical process. World power is the mind. The plan of the historical movement is the self-returned mind [4, p. 7].
- From the fourth thesis: the essence of mind is freedom, therefore the ultimate goal of history is the realization of freedom, its embodiment. An individual should follow the spirit in his desire for freedom to become a reality [4, p. 7].

Subsequent theses highlighted by Hartmann denote the consequences of the definition objective spirit for the historical process in general and are related to the problems of the formation of different peoples, the significance of historical epochs, etc. [4, p. 8-9].

So the doctrine of the objective Hegel's spirit is one of the most important starting points from which Hartmann proceeds in his studies of spiritual being, while substantially developing it, supplementing and correcting it. The structure of the study "Problems of spiritual existence" clearly shows this: *personal spirit* (self-sameness, reflection, supra-individual), *objective spirit* (language, science, morality, art, religion and mythology) and *objectified spirit* (works and creations).

One of the methodological implications of the provisions of the Hartmann ontology based on the system is the "cautious" treatment of general definitions. So the philosopher thinks that to give a full definition to such concepts as being, matter, spirit, substance, can only partially identify the essential features of the subject under investigation, which should be explained in the course of the study itself. The concept of the spirit is one of such concepts of general concepts. Nevertheless, one should say what the spirit is not, which is already clear from the very beginning of the study. Spirit is not a soul, not a psyche, not consciousness, not self-consciousness, not something floating, not God. The spirit has its own life, its laws and is not reduced to either consciousness, or organic, or to the physical world. The spirit in itself is something whole and indivisible, however, as already indicated above, appears in three forms: a personal spirit, an objective spirit and an objectified spirit. As a result of the combination of the individual spirit and the spirit of the objective, the "life" spirit is thus obtained, thus shining such a mode of being as reality.

Man-for-another (person) - language, art, science, - works, inventions. A person becomes historical by being involved in other people, through language, morals, etc., producing, creating, inventing works of art, inventing technical adaptations, etc. The key in this scheme is the objective spirit as the vehicle (subject) of history (in form of community, people, society, civilization).

- Basic definitions of the life spirit: reality, individuality, existence, temporality [4, p.79-88].
- Categorical originality of the vital spirit: temporality, identity, finiteness [4, p.88-100].

Is it possible to explain the emergence, development and very existence of civilization or culture on the basis of natural factors, social upheavals, confrontations of powers, etc.? The question of whether "it is possible to explain" presupposes the existence of interrelations, which, as is known, can either be necessary (laws) and random (inessential). In order to understand or establish something, we ignore some links, and attach importance to others on the basis of experience or from logical requirements. Such actions lead to determinism.

Dissolution of the essence of things, phenomena and events in processes and relationships is not a new fallacy. In opposition to this approach, various metaphysical doctrines are called up to answer questions like "the meaning of history," "the essence of the historical spirit," etc. There is no need to give examples of both approaches, they are generally known. Both approaches suffer from ignoring the factors that do not fit into the models they have adopted. Historical determinism suffers reductionism, reducing the historical process to the struggle between nature and man, and people among themselves, which is justified only from a part. Metaphysical doctrines are blind to the empirical story of history, they ignore everything atypical and individual, concentrating only on the general. N. Hartmann suggests the following way, which follows from his general scheme of ontology: there are four layers of real being - physical, organic, mental and spiritual (historical). Each layer of being has both dependence on the other, some autonomy, its own laws and its own "life." History can not be understood without assuming for it some autonomy, as a spiritual being. Otherwise, we again fall into the net of reductionism, reducing historical processes and events to the mental, organic or physical layer of being. On the other hand (as already mentioned) the spirit is not something weightless, the otherworldly, the transcendent, the spirit is real, and therefore exists in time, it is finite, individual, etc. The spirit can not exist without the previous layers of being: physical, organic and mental, while they can exist without a spirit. Again, the categories of the existence of the spirit and the category of our cognition are not one and the same, being and cognition are indifferent to each other, therefore the second will never exhaust the first. An objective spirit exists, arises and dies.

4. Conclusion

So, in general, Hartmann's ideas about spiritual being look like. But what can this kind of philosophy give for modern research in the field of culture? Is it relevant, and if so, what is it? In our opinion, the most significant, and therefore relevant, in the study of N. Hartmann's spiritual being are two mutually complementary aspects: ontological and methodological proper.

The ontological aspect consists in a) recognizing spiritual being as a self-sufficient, autonomous form of being, whose essence is manifested in its supra-individuality, in b) the strict definition of the place of the objective spirit between other kinds of being, and finally in c) the detailed elaboration of categories as the existence of spiritual being, so and its internal interaction and development.

The methodological aspect consists, first of all, in a strict division of the being of the spirit and its categories from the cognition of the spirit and its categories; also no less significant is the cognitive setting according to which, it is always necessary to proceed from the subject of research and only thus to formulate the methods of its investigation, rather than to first search for optimal methods borrowing them from other sources and similar areas of research. The means of cognition are historical and changeable, while the subjects of research (in their ontological dimension) are unchanged. It should also be noted (although this is more a technique) the virtuoso use of distinctions (which is so lacking in modern research), which makes it possible to distinguish the subject of research from others and thereby avoid, somewhat this is allowed by the very subject of research, confusion and ambiguity.

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