

European Security and Defence Policy

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Introduction

In 1998, the British and French government sign an agreement at St. Malo, which gave the EU governments the opportunity to pave their political path by launching the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council in 1999. This agreement stated that “the European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Rutten, 2001).

The primary objective of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed by European Members in December 2007, was to let the EU become a more global actor. 25 out of the 62 amendments that this Treaty makes to its predecessors, the Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht treaty are applied to provisions on foreign and security policy. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was set up to give more space than the previous European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This was not the only improvement, the CSDP includes also joint disarmament operations, (post)-conflict stabilisation and the fight against terrorism (Roger-Lacan, 2008). The EU governments have carried out a lot of operations, this can be seen as the most significant aspect of the first ten years of the ESDP. Since the first mission was launched in 2003, the EU governments have managed operations all over Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. However, the ESDP has also a variety in tasks. For example the traditional military peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina to training the Afghan and Iraqi police forces (Wittebrod, 2007).

The question is if the ESDP has met those expectations. This essay will first clarify what the ESDP really is and explain which institutions it contains.. So, the first part of the essay will explain the ESDP institutions and the military resources. Secondly, the focus will be on the future plans of the ESDP and how they take more responsibility in different tasks compared with the past.

I've chosen to first give an explanation of the ESDP in general and after that the reforms. It is important to explain in a comprehensively way how the ESDP functions and to explain their military resources to understand the full package (Hamulak, 2016).

In sum, as there is a lot to tell about the development of the ESDP. During the first years, the ESDP has greatly evolved since its birth at the EU Cologne in 1999. As Javier Solana, the EU's former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, once said: ‘Development of ESDP's crisis management capacity is crucial to contributing effectively to international peace and security. It is the missing link. EU foreign policy used to be about declarations. Now the EU puts people in large, visible numbers on the ground and takes risks for peace’ (Witney, 2008).

The ESDP institutions

The Council Secretariat and the Member States are the most important actors of the ESDP policy-making process. The national political leaders of each Member State meet in the European Council at the level of Heads of State and Government (Roger-Lacan, 2008).

Institutional framework

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an integral part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which shall include all questions related to the security of the Union’ (article 17 TEU). The institutional frameworks of the CFSP and ESDP overlap but the institutions and procedures of the ESDP have had an permanent expansion over the last ten years. This process is a good respond to the requirements of the St. Malo Declaration (Morawa, 2016). In this declaration is said that the Union must have a credible military capacity and the means to decide to use this capacity and to be ready to do so. It is important that the European Union is given the capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a strategic planning. At the time of the St. Malo Declaration, the focus was more on the military crisis management but later on, it also applied to the civilian dimension of the ESDP. In other words, the European Union must have the capacity to decide on this and the EU Member States have the final call based on the unanimity rule (Rutten, 2001).

Briefly, the capacity to decide is the same as having the ability to formulate, adopt and implement decisions. In terms of ESDP, this contains five key functions (Lindstrom, 2004):

- The ability to agree on common political and strategic priorities;
- To development of the conceptual framework for EU crisis management;
- To collect adequate information and generate joint analysis;
- To harness and expand the military, civilian and financial resources available for the European Union;
- To carry out crisis management operations.

The institutional framework of the ESDP should make sure that these functions are effectively fulfilled. The engagement of the Member States is most of the times seen as the main strength of the ESDP. The capacity to achieve a decision is can be predicted on the convergence of the national position of the Member States (Nyman-Metcalf, 2010). However, the mobilisation of the Member States and other relevant actors in the decision-making process, has a big influence on the effectiveness of the actual decision. To bring this to a good end, the convergence of the Member States and the enhanced coherence is difficult to keep in a permanent balance between national interests and institutional perspectives. Moreover, to generate this actions at the level of the ESDP, a political convergence and policy coherence is indispensable (Grevi, 2007).

European Commission

The Commission can be associated with the work that has to be carried out of the CFSP and they play an important role in the context of the ESDP in two ways. Firstly, the Commission does the administration of the CFSP budget and secondly, it works with the Council at different levels in the decision-making process so it can promote coherence between ESDP initiatives and Community assistance (Grevi, 2007; European Commission, 2008).

The European Council

The European Council is the highest political institution of the European Union and is therefore responsible for defining the principles of the CFSP. The European Council has the authority of common strategies in the interest of the EU Member States. So ESDP really matters because the decisions and deliberations taken by the European Council are crucial for the development of the ESDP (Michel, 2006).

The meetings over the years have provided useful input to the establishment and development of the ESDP. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), for example, was a milestone in this development. From 2002 until 2004, the European Council approved several documents which consisted important information about the relationship between the European Union and the NATO (Fischer, 2011). The European Council ratified new procedures which approved the cooperation between the two organisations. On top of that, at the end of each Presidency term, the European Council receives an important report on the ESDP which includes the achieved progress and priorities. Together with the Commission, the Council has the responsibility to ensure the overall consistency of the external activities of the European Union (Grevi, 2007).

General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

In this council, political negotiations and decision-making about the CFSP and ESDP takes place. Foreign Ministers prepare the proceedings of the European Council in the GAERC. It implements the CFSP and ESDP by adopting joint actions, common positions and Council decisions (Art. 13 and 14 TEU). The GAERC is the top decision-taking authority, in particular with regard to the planning and launch. Members of the GAERC come together once a year to review achievements and to detect shortcomings (Lindstrom, 2004).

Presidency of the Council

The rotating system of the presidency of the Council has an important impact on the working agenda, even to some extent in setting the priorities of the European Union. The president's task is to represent the European Union in CFSP matters and during the implementation of relevant decisions. The rotating system affects the ESDP agenda in an uneven way, as not every country has the expertise and resources to make a real impact on it (European Commission, 2008; Grevi, 2007)).

The Political and Security Committee

The core responsibility of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) lies in the area of the crisis management. During crises, the PSC should examine the situation and assess various policy options to finally make proposals to the Council. Once the ESDP operation has launched, the PSC exerts political control over the operation under the responsibility of the Council. So, in the sensitive field of crisis management, the PSC has

the power of giving advice about policies and give recommendation in the run-up to formal decisions. The PSC exercises these powers in consultation with other ESDP committees and the Council Secretariat (Lieb, 2007).

The EU Military

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the 'highest military body established within the Council' and provides military advice to the Political and Security Committee. This body was set up as a sort of interim body in 2000 but in January 2001, it became permanent. This Committee consists of Chiefs of Defence of the Member States and meets twice a year in Brussels (Kerikmae, 1997). The Committee selects its own Chairman who is appointed by the Council for a term of three years. This Chairman is the only one out of all the ESDP committees which is not chaired by a representative of the rotating presidency. He/she exercises five important roles, namely (Bah, 2008):

- Provide military advice to the High Representative ;
- Participate when relevant in meetings of the Political and Security Committee;
- Attend Council meetings when decisions with defence implications need to be taken;
- Issue guidance and directives to the European Union Military Committee;
- Act as the primary point of contact with the Operation Commander of an ESDP military operation.

Political Military Group

The Political Military Group (PMG) is in theory somehow located in between the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (see below). These two are seen as the top advisory bodies concerning military and civilian ESDP. In 2001, the PMG was established as a group by the COREPER, but it has a very vague mandate because it only assists the PSC by doing the preparatory work on ESDP matters. So the PMG lacks a specific mission and profile, except dealing with the political dimension of military issues (Grevi, 2008).

Committee for Civilian Crisis Management

The first civilian crisis management missions in 2003 were very important for the role of the CIVCOM. It is marked as being the turning point for the Committee because since then, a lot of time goes to the planning and monitoring of civilian missions (Kerikmae, 2001). The CIVCOM should perform similar tasks as the EUMC, at least on the civilian side of the process, namely in providing PSC options about the civilian crisis management. This is why this body is important to the ESDP policy-making but it is also put under a lot of pressure (Grevi, 2008).

Foreign Relations Counsellors

The main role of the Foreign Relations Counsellors is to provide viable options and technical expertise, as being a working group (Grevi, 2008). Their role is discrete but necessary, they give specific advice about the ESDP process about institutional, financial and legal matters of ESDP decision-making problems. This working group was established in 1994 as a consequent of the expansion of COREPER's competence to CFSP matters. National representatives of the Member States were hereby pushed to create a new body and this is how the Foreign Relations Counsellors originated. These Counsellors draft all the legal acts and oversee the legal aspects of the bureaucratic framework (Quille, 2008)).

Secretary General / High Representative

The Secretary General / High Representative (SG/HR) is an actor within the General Secretariat. The authority of the SG/HR is rather modest. It has the task to assist the Presidency of the Council in CFSP matters. This contains contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions. It also has to conduct political dialogue with third parties of the Council or the Presidency requests for this (Ortega, 2005).

Military Resources

One of the biggest challenges for the ESDP was to find good resources so it could perform effectively and ensure international security. This was one of the main objectives who were set during the establishment of the ESDP in 1999. During the first ten years, the ESDP has suffered from several shortcomings in quantity as well as quality of available resources. This section analyses the civil, military and financial resources available to the ESDP (Rosen, 2009).

The European Union does not own their own army of does not possess a defence budget. Each Member State of the European Union has their own army and has full sovereignty over their armed forces. Member States can choose for their own if they want to contribute to ESDP operations (Ballesteros, 2017). How much money each Member State should spend on defence, is up to the Member States themselves to decide and not the EU institutions. In total, the Member States spend over €200 billion on defence collectively which should be enough to cover all Europe's defence needs. Despite this, Europeans do not have enough soldiers with the necessary skills for international peacekeeping operations. Some Member States did not even reform their armed forces after the Cold War into a participating army. Apart from this, EU armies also need more useful military equipment. For example, for the peacekeeping operation in Eastern Chad, it took six months for the EU governments to find good equipment, after these six months, they were only in the possession of sixteen helicopters and ten short-range transport planes (Rosen, 2009).

It can be said that the European defence budgets have fallen as a percentage of GDP in the last twelve years. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU average for defence spending as a proportion of GDP fell from 1.81 percent in 2005 to 1.69 percent in 2007. On top of that, the cost of defence equipment is rising every year by six to eight percent which puts EU military establishments under pressure. And no one country is wealthy enough in this domain to afford to buy a full range of equipment. However, the EU governments are therefore discussing about several defence equipment programmes to counter this problem (Tardy, 2009).

Selected EU Military Capabilities 1999-2009

	1999: EU15	1999: EU27	2009: EU27	Change: '99-'09
Defence expenditure				
Total expenditure	€156.2 Bn	€162.9 Bn	209.7 Bn	+ 29%
Expenditure/GDP	2.1%	2.1%	1.7%	+19%
Budget/GDP	1.7%	1.8%	1.4%	-22%
Armed forces				
Total Active Military	1.759.568	2.478.608	2.013.990	-19%
Army	1.125.718	1.516.378	996.234	34%
Navy	281.450	327.400	222.313	-32%
Air Force	381.605	538.925	345.153	-36%
Conscripts	669.770	1131.020	212.785	-81%
Equipment				
Land	10.827	17.814	9.823	-45%
Main Battle Tanks	10.827	17.814	9.823	-45%
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	6.851	10.622	7.951	-25%
Armoured Personnel Carriers	19.751	26.311	22.844	-13%
Aviation				
Fixed Wing Aircraft	5.600	7.453	5.401	-28%
Fighter Jets	2.6584	3.835	2.410	-37%
Transport (incl. tankers)	439	612	898	+47%
Helicopters	3.515	4.732	3.573	-24%
Attack	1.000	1.312	826	-37%
Combat support	969	1.305	849	-35%
Utility (incl. transport)	445	584	1.076	+84%
Naval				
Aircraft Carriers	6	6	7	+17%
Destroyers	29	31	26	-16%

Frigates	145	155	108	-30%
Patrol and Coastal	314	521	811	+56%
Mine Warfare	208	296	24	-18%
Amphibious	26	274	494	+80%

The estimates in this table above are taken from The Military Balance 1999-2000 and The Military Balance 2009, both published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Europe in 2025

The making of the European defence policy

Although it took almost three decades to establish a Single European Market, the ESDP seems to be developing really quick. The European economic and political integration process in the 1990s also needed a security and defence policy for several reasons. First of all, the focus of the US is no longer on Europe but has shifted to the Koreas, Taiwan, the Caspian Sea basin, the Gulf Region, the Middle East and South America. This because of what happened on 9/11 and the war against terrorism. Secondly, when Yugoslavia collapsed, Europe was unable to develop a common foreign policy (Troitiño, 2017). Thirdly, Europe was also not military capable to deal with the atrocities who were taking place in their own backyard. This has led to the realisation that the West European Union (WEU) had to reorganise the European armed forces for crisis management. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consequently, with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Security and Defence Policy was established (Wright, 2009).

The Iraq crisis

The Iraq crisis has triggered the deepest transatlantic crisis in many years. The Bush administration's unilateralism is based on selective engagement in world politics questions the relationship between the US and some of the major continental European players. In Europe, some new divisions appeared as well. Spain, Italy and most of the East European countries supported the US and the UK, while France and Germany were against the policies of the Bush administration. France resistance was the strongest towards the US policy about Iraq. Germany joined France in its use of international institutions and ad hoc coalitions as a counterpoint to the US's policy against Iraq (Chochia, 2015). This cooperation should not be underestimated. The marginalisation of France and Germany, had an influence on Washington. It namely failed to understand the development of this crisis and the consequences of their policy. The US also did not grasped the consensus about the need of an ESDP in Europe. France and Germany have introduced harmonizing policies in a strategic partnership, as a result of this, they became the driving force for the European integration. At this time, it was clear that the US' unilateralism has given Europe no other choice then to develop new initiatives for a closer European defence cooperation. The Union must be able to fulfil its international role to the fullest and to speak in one voice. This was one of the basic requirements of a credible security and defence policy (Wittebrod, 2007).

Scenarios

Nowadays, security threats are not far away from us. Political leaders try to respond to these threats with a set of initiatives that will be implemented as a global strategy in the field of security and defence. In this way, stronger relations between the EU and NATO will hopefully be developed and so it can enable Member States to engage in defence research and offer defence capabilities. The European security and defence union has been gradually built to protect citizens and to make them feel and be safe. To fully achieve this, progress in various areas is required (Wright, 2009).

First of all, as Member States are becoming more sovereign in the current globalised world, more cooperation within the European Union – including on defence – is needed. However, Member States have to fully respect the other countries' constitutional rights and responsibilities (Wright, 2009).

Secondly, there have been differences in threat perceptions and strategic cultures over time. We now face transnational threats and hybrid ones, as well as suffering from the impact of conflicts in surrounding regions. A security and defence union has to encourage a common understanding of threats as well as a stronger alignment of strategic cultures. Then it will be able to give appropriate responses, because it requires joint decision-making actions and financial solidarity at European level (Wright, 2009; Witney, 2008).

Thirdly, the nature of the transatlantic relationship is expanding, because of the reason that European countries have to take greater responsibility for their own security. The EU and NATO will continue to cooperation on hard and soft security (Troitiño, 2014). The EU will provide this within the Member States, so they can strengthen their defence and address their shortcomings. This approach will give the EU Member

States the change to charge their own security to a greater extent which will make it easier to contribute to international peace and security (Schroeder, 2007).

Fourth, the scope and efficiency of defence spending has to be increased. Interoperability of defence equipment can be affected by duplications between Member States. This can also lead to a lack of preparation of armed forces and gaps in defence capabilities. To get a better view of this, Member States should coordinate their defence spending better. The biggest part of financial resources for defence will continue to come from national sources. How the current limitations to the common financing of EU military aspects can be overcome, will be considered by the European Council (Wright, 2009).

Finally, a true single market for defence is required in turn of systematic defence cooperation and integration. This means that the following list should be encouraged (Wright, 2009):

- industrial competition;
- cross border access of smaller industries in the supply chain;
- specialisation;
- economies of scale for suppliers;
- optimised production capacity;
- lower production costs
- security of supply.

A single market for defence would also make critical research easier, but for this, Europe has to address its security challenges to start-ups so they can develop the required technologies. Besides, there will be transition costs and legitimate concerns to ensure the protection of national security interests. Depending on what Member States politically really want in their country, three scenarios can be faced by looking forward to 2025. These scenarios eventually lead all in the same direction. All three of them take the different trends and strategic drivers into account. These scenarios are illustrative and do not affect the legal and political position of the European Commission (Valasek, 2008).

Security and defence cooperation

In this scenario, the EU Member States are supposed to cooperate on security and defence more frequently than they did before. This kind of cooperation would be largely voluntary and depends on ad hoc decisions when a new crisis emerges (Färber, 2017). However, in an increasingly unstable and more complex world, it is not obligatory for Member states to be bound, politically as well as legally, by a common direction in security and defence. Solidarity is expected on a case-by-case basis by each Member State. The European Union would still be able to deploy civilian missions and operating in crisis management (Wright, 2009; Valasek 2008).

The most capable Member State would be the leader of larger-scale operations. The Member States have to agree on the strategic margin of manoeuvre of the European Union. The cooperation with NATO will continue in areas such as cyber and maritime security, hybrid threats and where responses are required as a combination of hard and soft power. However, when both the EU and NATO are present, NATO will continue to use their military capabilities, whereas the EU would utilize its broader toolbox with “softer” tools (Lieb, 2007).

Defence cooperation would remain a political goal. In this scenario would be more collective work on the development of selected technologies or on the logistical enablers of military operations. An increase in cooperation would partially result from the increase of transparency of Member States’ defence planning, the creation of an EU defence research programme and the establishment of the European defence fund. These initiatives would have a positive influence on Europe’s strategic autonomy in critical technologies and would increase the value for money of defence spending (Lieb, 2007; Wright, 2009).

However, the defence industry of Europe would remain fragmented. The biggest part of defence capabilities would continue to be developed on a national basis. The increase in defence spending by Member States would not be spent collaboratively. As a result, EU countries would keep very few armed forces. EU security would continue to depend on voluntary national contributions, which lead to insufficient cooperation in critical situations (Lieb, 2007).

Shared security and defence

In this scenario, the EU Member States would show far greater financial and operational solidarity. The aim is to build on a broader and deeper understanding of respective threat perceptions. As a result, the EU would anticipate on this and enhance its ability to engage fully in external crisis management. They would project military power and build security for partners. It would also improve counterterrorism, countering of hybrid and cyber-threats, border control and maritime and energy security (Wright, 2009).

The cooperation between the EU and NATO would go to a next level. They would systematically cooperate and coordinate in crisis management and capacity-building actions. At the point where internal and external security comes together, the EU would take decisions to deal with threats. On top of that, the EU would also project military force externally to fight against terrorism and hybrid threats for example (Troitino, 2013).

The EU would build more capacity missions – civilian and military – which will help countries by a more robust crisis management structure. The EU would also be more engaged in the protection of Member States in case something bad happens to their citizens. The EU would cooperate with the Member States by systematically reporting on attacks. This will increase resilience. This cooperation will increase the ability to find and punish criminals, which provides a stronger deterrent against possible attacks (Michel, 2006).

On defence, cooperation between the Member States is the norm. In this way, duplication between Member States would drastically decrease and the cooperation in complex platforms will further develop in a positive way (Michel, 2006; Bah, 2008).

Common defence and security

In this scenario, Member States would deepen cooperation and integration further towards a common defence and security. Such a security would be seen as a global strategy, which would be in the field of economy, technology and political. Here, solidarity and mutual assistance between Member States would be the norm (Lieb, 2007).

The Member States see their common defence and security realised in NATO, because the protection of Europe would become a mutual responsibility of the EU in cooperation with NATO. The common security and defence would improve Europe’s resilience and protection against any form of aggression against the Union will be provided (Wright, 2009).

Security threats would be determined jointly in close cooperation with intelligence services and national governments. This would lead to a greater level of integration of Member States’ defence forces at EU level. Furthermore, it would create more solidarity among Member States. Forces would be permanently available on behalf of the Union and they would participate in joint military exercises with a regular training in European defence colleges. As a result, a European civil protection force will be created which would rapidly interact to disasters or attacks (Nowak, 2006).

	Principles	Actions	Capabilities	Efficiency
Security and defence cooperation	The EU complements Member States efforts, solidarity remains ad hoc and interpreted individually by Member States	Capacity-building missions, small crisis management operations, greater exchange of intel, EU support to Member State resilience. EU-NATO cooperation continues as it is now.	Capacity-building missions, small crisis management operations, greater exchange of intel, EU support to Member State resilience, EU-NATO cooperation continues as it is now.	Initial economies of scale
Shared security and defence	EU supplements Member State efforts, operational and financial solidarity between Member States become the norm	Crisis management, capacity-building and protection at internal-external nexus. Member States monitor each other on issues and share intel, European Border and Coast Guards protect external borders. EU-NATO coordinate on full spectrum of hard/soft security areas	Joint financing of key capabilities and joint purchase of multinational capabilities supported by the European defence fund; common planning and development of value chains	Considerable economies of scale in defence market at European scale, favourable financing conditions across the defence supply chain.
Common defence and security	Solidarity and mutual assistance, common defence as set out in the Treaty	Demanding executive EU-led operations; joint monitoring of threats and contingency planning. European civilian protection force. Complementing NATO, Europe’s common security and defence would enhance Europe’s resilience and protect against different forms of aggression against the Union	Common financing and procurement of capabilities supported by the EU budget.	Efficient defence spending through more economies of scale, specialisation, sharing of expensive military assets and technological innovation aimed at reducing defence costs.

Conclusion

Improving European security is a must. Member States have to spend a lot of time in the security and defence policy by defining and implementing the European ambition at national level with the support of the EU institutions. This essay shows that the EU and the Member States have already put a lot of effort in the enhancement of the EU defence (Ramiro, 2013).

The primary objective of the Treaty of Lisbon was to let the EU become a more global actor. The last few years, the EU has put a lot of effort to fulfil this objective via different canals, for example the setup of the Common Security and Defence Policy after the European Security and Defence Policy. This was one of the main improvements that the EU has made. The CSDP shows that it had a big influence on disarmament operations, conflict stabilisations and fight against terrorism. The cooperation between the EU governments have carried out a lot of operations since its establishment (Troitiño, 2008).

The European Union does not own their own army or does not possess a defence budget. It is important that each Member State of the European Union contributes to the EU's defence and to choose how much they spent. Despite this, the ESDP seems to develop really quickly and it seems like it will meet their expectations that are mention in the Europe 2025 plan.

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